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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., most famously expressed the idea that
regulation is theft in a 1922 epigrammatical aside: "the petty larceny of the
police power."' That this oft cited phrase was an aside-indeed said sotto voce,
1. This remark is contained in a letter to Harold J. Laski dated October 22, 1922: "In this one
[Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)] my brethren, as usual and as I expected, corrected
my taste when I spoke of relying upon the petty larceny of the police power, dele 'the petty larceny
of ." I HoLMEs-LAsIU LETrERs 338 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) [hereinafter LETrERS]. That
remark was contained in the following passage with the "dele" in brackets: "But if... it has been
the [longtime] understanding that the burden exists, the land owner does not have the right to that
part of his land except as so qualified and the statute that embodies that understanding does not need
to invoke [the petty larceny of] the police power." Jackman, 260 U.S. at 31. In Jackman, Holmes
made this earlier reference to the police power:
In the State Court the judgment was justified by reference to the power of the
State to impose burdens upon property or to cut down its value in various ways
without compensation, as a branch of what is called the police power. The
exercise of this has been held warranted in some cases by what we may call the
average reciprocity of advantage, although the advantages may not be equal in
the particular case.
Id at 30.
The following inferences can be made from the above: (1) the other members of the
Court did not believe that police power reduction of property values was theft; (2) Holmes thought
petty theft could only be justified by "the average reciprocity of advantage," i.e., we are all in the
thievery together, stealing from one another, (3) a grand theft will likely not be covered by
reciprocity and therefore might be a taking (thus presaging Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922)) and (4) the rest of the Court, not having bought (1), did not believe (2) or (3)
either. Thus "average reciprocity of advantage" was not, doctrinally, the justification for not
requiring compensation for property values lost due to regulation. An alternative justification, one
with which this article resonates, is that we hold all private property subject to police power
interference such that value-giving uses of the things of property are not "property rights" (subject
to being "taken") until the uses become possessory. Holmes recognized that he was insinuating a
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off stage-is significant. His fellow judges thought it an impertinence.2 When
a month later he made his views as to regulatory theft appear to be the basis of
a takings decision, he muted the strident sound of police power thievery by
talking about the "extent of the diminution."3 Moreover, he did not use any
phrase that unmistakenly identified value in land as property---"values incident
to property" imply the opposite. Nonetheless, his reasoning seems to say-and
has long been held by constitutional scholars as saying-that the market value of
land is "property" within the meaning of the Takings Clause and that the state
rationale not shared by his brethren, which is shown by the next line in the letter quoted above:
"But I saved something that I really wanted by giving it a turn as if it might have come from the
Court below-no false representations, only a slight ambiguity." LETTERS, supra, at 338.
Obviously what he saved was "the average reciprocity of advantage" rationale by "giving it [the]
turn" that "has been held warranted in some cases." Id.
The New York Landmark Preservation case, Penn Central Transportation Company v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) shows this talk about "average
re.ciprocity of advantage" to be no mere quibble. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147.
2. See, e.g., Jackman, 260 U.S. 22. Without dissent, Holmes held that the lower court judgment
was "justified by the power of the State to impose burdens upon property . . . without
compensation, as a branch of.. . the police power." Id. at 30.
3. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
4. The idea that all uses of the things of property, actual and potential, are "property rights" subject
to taking when barred by regulation seems quaint to me, but it is not an old idea. It began more
or less with Holmes's opinion in Mahon. But see infra note 6. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A
Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAW AND HIST. REV. 1, 6-13
(1986). Thus Holmes's idea of property is quaint, not because the technical jural notion of
"property" thereby implied was old-fashioned, but because the word "property" was used by Holmes
to mean wealth. Legal culture has been seen as primarily concerned to protect the wealthy-the
propertied class-in the era between the Civil War and the Great Depression. Substantive due
process was a primary weapon in such protection. Holmes was seen as allied with Justice Louis
Brandeis against the conservatism of legal doctrine, especially substantive due process. Now here
is Holmes using another doctrine-the Takings Clause-to protect property as wealth and using the
term "property," as a layman would to mean wealth. So I guess I am jarred by the notion of this
progressive lawyer's lawyer (Holmes is the apotheosis of legal culture) using the word "property"
like a layman and for a conservative cause.
Surprisingly, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF.AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, ProfessorMorton
J. Horwitz asserts in a chapter entitled "The Progressive Transformation in the Conception of
Property":
Though the broadest implications of [Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871)] only gradually emerged, the case immediately presented a
challenge to the prevailing idea that a taking constituted either a physical
trespass or appropriation of title. Instead, it soon came to stand for the
increasingly prevalent proposition that all restrictions on the use of property that
diminished its market value were takings in the constitutional sense. By 1893,
Pumpelly was being cited to support the expansive conclusion that any
interference with the future income stream of an owner constitutes a taking of
property.
MORTON J. HoRwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 148 (1992).
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can take some of this property, but if it "goes too far" it is an unconstitutional
taking.' In other words, the constitution will tolerate state petty larceny but not
grand larceny.6 Whoops! Judges ought not to say such things,7 and they usually
Neither Pumpelly (holding that land flooded by a government dam was "taken") nor the
other cases cited by Horwitz support his extraordinary conclusion. To Horwitz, the value theory
of property was the final triumph of Classical Legal Thought ("CLT"), the bete noire eventually
slain by progressive legal thought (read American Legal Realism) only, to Horwitz's regret, the
slaying came undone after World War II. One thesis of this piece is that CLT never had this
"triumph."
5. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
6. This idea of "property" meaning "value" may have seemed especially odd coming from Holmes.
Louis Brandeis thought his old friend was, in the modem vernacular, "losing it." See LIVA BAKER,
THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs 567 (1991):
Brandeis concluded that Holmes's apparent turnabout should be attributed to a
"heightened respect for property" he believed had become part of Holmes's
growing old, a reversion to "views not of his manhood but childhood."
Brandeis was one of Holmes's few friends who realized how hard it always had
been for Holmes "to rid himself of undue regard for property" intellectually and
that emotionally Holmes was entirely incapable of it.
But even more, Brandeis ascribed Holmes's vote in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. to an unaccustomed intellectual weakness that followed Holmes [major
medical] surgery of the previous summer.
Id. at 569. But see Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (Holmes as early
as 1908 laying the groundwork for Mahon):
For instance, the police power may limit the height of buildings, in a city,
without compensation. To that extent it cuts down what otherwise would be the
rights of property. But if it should attempt to limit the height so far as to make
an ordinary building lot wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail
over the other public interest, and the police power would fail. To set such a
limit would need compensation and the power of eminent domain.
Id. at 355.
This tossed off bit of dictum, a mere aside in the case, shows that Holmes thought that
"rights of property" included future or contemplated uses of property and that "rights of property"
were property within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Moreover, he also clearly believed that
"property" (within the Takings Clause meaning) can be taken without compensation. The state
simply may not "take" so much as to make the "lot wholly useless." Thus, he suggests the all/some
line for diminished value (if all value is lost, a taking; if some (any) value left, no taking). Therein
lies the embryo for Mahon and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
See infra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
7. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
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don't, but that seems to be what Holmes said if we take his "talk" seriously. So
for about seventy years the Supreme Court did not take his "talk" seriously in the
sense of making a decision that depended on it, although they often cited the
Holmes diminution of value dictum.8 But that changed in 1992.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court, speaking through
Justice Scalia, actually relied on the diminution of value theory for the first time.9
The whole nonsensical mess-property is market value, take some but not too
much-was actually necessary to the result in Lucas. Although Justice Scalia
sugarcoats his nonsense, the diminution of value theory is unmistakably necessary
to the result. Furthermore, the diminution of value theory as an interpretation of
the Takings Clause is unmistakably constitutional nonsense, as I shall make clear.
The burden of this article is not merely to make clear that Lucas was a
true expression of the diminution of value theory (and is nonsense) but also to
propose a reading of the Takings Clause consonant with its text, its history and
constitutional sense. Moreover, I shall suggest an alternative basis for judicial
review of the regulatory diminution of values, especially in land, and will argue
that it is important to use this alternative as it has been used by state courts for
years. To this end, I begin with a brief general discussion of constitutional
interpretation and the text of the Takings Clause in Part I. In Part II, I discuss
the development of the takings doctrine until Lucas. Part III describes the
alternative to takings review, substantive due process. In Part IV, I propose my
own formulation of Takings Clause interpretation and apply it to several paradigm
cases including Lucas. In Part V, I sum up my view: subject to a "reasonable"
due process review, the state may regulate uses of land to the hilt, but it may not
steal (petty or grand) one's property in one's land.
face.
Id.
Holmes also dissented from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that admitted illegally
obtained wire-tap evidence because wire tapping was not literally a "search and seizure" within the
Fourth Amendment. In particular, Holmes stated, "for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part." Id. at 470.
8. Until 1992, no decision of the United States Supreme Court relied on Mahon. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1982).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2886.
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I. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TAKINGS: SOME CONSTRAINTs ON DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT
A. The Letter of the Takings Clause
Three formal constraints exist on formulations of constitutional doctrine:
text, context and judicial precedent. I begin with text both because the
Constitution is important and because it is too often ignored. The text is
important because it is a written document that is being interpreted.'° The
10. Even Professor Ronald Dworkin, who advocates a very non-intentionalist program for legal
interpretation, reminds us that central to his interpretation of a text is that it is the text being vivified
not remade. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146-77 (1985) [hereinafter MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86,359-79 (1986) [hereinafter LAW'S EMPIRE].
"Interpretation of a text attempts to show it as the best work of art it can be, and the pronoun insists
on the difference between explaining a work of art and changing it into a different one." MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE, supra, at 150 (emphasis in original). "The text provides one severe constraint in the
name of identity: all words must be taken account of and none may be changed to make 'it' a
putatively better work of art." Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 531
(1982).
It is true that Professor Stanley Fish has famously skewered Dworkin for his interpretive
theory by showing Dworkin to be an interpretive positivist (believing that words and texts have
perspicuous meaning independent of any interpretation-the meaning is just "out there"). Stanley
Fish, WrongAgain, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299, 309-11 (1983). Fish has also criticized Dworkin's belief
that there can be interpretation independent of attribution of a speaker's intention. Id. at 313-16.
My position-that texts are constraints on interpretation and that arguments aboutthe Constitution's
meaning must begin and end with the words of the Constitution in order to be persuasive-is not
inconsistent with Fish's seemingly radical position. To outline Fish's position:
(1) There is no such thing as an uninterpreted text-a text is every particular (sensible)
reading of the marks on paper. Every reading is an interpretation; there is no objective or "just out
there" or positivist's meaning. Texts do not constrain as if there were a preinterpretive object there.
Id. at 301-03.
(2) Interpretation is constrained by the convention of practice within a profession,
discipline or community-conventions of description, argument, judgment and persuasion. Id. at
313.
(3) Interpretation necessarily (psychologically, not analytically) includes intention: one
cannot think of the meaning of something uttered without an intended agent; the agent is usually,
but not necessarily, a historical person. Id. at 313-16.
With this in mind, if there is no Takings Clause "text" independent of any reading of the
Clause, nonetheless the "constraining" interpretive practice of the legal and political culture includes
a convention that words do have real, stable core denotative meaning which may change over time.
Persuasion about what the marks on paper mean includes appeal to that deeply held belief.
Moreover, if "intentor" there always be, let that intentor be like "the spirit of the age" or "the
intentional structure of language." Id. at 315. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE,
FOuNDATIONs 3-31 (1991); James McLaughlin, What Has the Supreme Court Taught? Part HI, 72
W. VA. L. REV. 326, 326-33 (1970).
I am not saying, in any event, that the text is the beginning and the end of argument about
its meaning. Instead, any argument about the meaning of a text of written law ought to begin and
end with the marks on paper conventionally called the "text." This is because interpretive practice
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formulation must flow plausibly from the words in the text. The use of the words
in the text must seem natural to those who speak our language as informed by our
legal culture. This is a constraint from the idea of written law itself. Since the
institution of judicial review is premised on our Constitution being written law,"
this formalist constraint is imperative to legitimacy. To some the formalist
constraint will seem but a truism; 2 to others it will seem a relic of the age of
classical legal orthodoxy' 3-an orthodoxy swept away by "legal realism,"
"progressivism" or "pragmatic instrumentalism," i.e., swept away by dominant
in our polity concerning the meaning of the Constitution assumesthat there is an external, objective
text that constrains; it is that assumption that justifies judicial review in some part (for Marshall,
it was the whole justification). Therefore, our argumentative practice dictates that we refer to the
words of the text in a manner showing that we take the assumption seriously. Beginning and ending
with those words is a methodology that shows adherence to that argumentative practice. See infra
note 11.
11. "Begging" for a moment Chief Justice Marshall's begging the question in Marburyv. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), the opinion is pregnant with the idea that a written constitution must
be applied by courts like other law, and when the legislature acts so as to transgress the words of
the Constitution, then the act is void. ("Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument" Id. at 180 (first emphasis added).).
What Marshall assumed was that words, and words in sentences and sentences in ....
etc., have plain meanings and, indeed, true (or what we might now say as "objectively true" or just
"objective") meanings. He did not assume that every reading is an interpretation, nor that every
interpretation is subjective. To Marshall, words do not usually need to be interpreted (the word
"interpret" appears once in the opinion) and when they must be "construed" their true meaning in
context must be retrieved. Listen to Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,441
(1827) (emphasis added):
The power [to tax persons and property within their territory], and the
restriction on it, though quite distinguishable, when they do not approach each
other, may yet, when the intervening colors between white and black, approach
so nearly, as to perplex the understanding, as colors perplex the vision, in
marking the distinction between them. Yet the distinction exists, and must be
marked as the cases arise.
Would we not say, "yet the distinction must be made, and we are the ones who have to make it"?
Marshall had earlier referred to "the true meaning of a clause." Id. at 437.
When our Constitution was written and the institution of judicial review developed,
Marshall's assumptions were the assumptions of legal culture and most educated people, and they
still may be. See Fredrick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985) [hereinafter Easy
Cases]. No matter how naive (or clever) we now think Marshall had been (See William W.
VanAlstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1), his assumptions are how
we, as a polity, are constituted. To be true to ourselves, legal argument about the meaning of the
Constitution ought to begin and end with its words no matter how wide the argument might range
in between.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See HORWTrz, supra note 4.
1995]
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
twentieth century legal thought. 4 However, even conceding that the premises of
realism dominate modem thought, "pragmatic instrumentalism" has never
advocated throwing out the formal "baby" with the non-functional, non-contextual
"bath water."' 5
How might this make a concrete difference in formulating an
interpretation? Two examples of violations of the textual constraint illustrate my
point. The Court resurrected the Contract Clause 6 in 1977.17 Justice Blackmun
wrote the opinion in which the Court struck down a New Jersey modification of
the terms of a contract with investors in New York Port Authority bonds. 8 He
could have said, consistent with prior doctrine, that the modification concerned
a central undertaking of the contract and therefore was'an "impairment" in
violation of the absolute language of the Constitution that "No State shall...
pass any ... Law impairing the obligation of Contracts."19 Instead, Blackmun
wrote that the "impairment" could be sustained if it was both "reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose."'2
The only logical conclusion from this is that the language of the
Constitution has been changed and now should read: "No state shall pass any law
impairing the obligation of contract except when reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose." What warrant is there for such amendments
to the Constitution? None, of course.2 ' The argument that every interpretation
14. See id.; Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal
Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory about Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 861 (1981); Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in
Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986).
15. See Fredrick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982)
[hereinafter Essay]; Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 11; Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
L.J. 509 (1988) [hereinafter Formalism]. But see Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction:
The Failure of the Word "Bird," 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 536 (1990) (presenting a brief and
unconvincing little joke at Schauer's expense).
16. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10: "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts."
17. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (applying the same principle to the federal
government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
18. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
19. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
20. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.
21. Justice Blackmun did say that the reason every "technical impairment" was not a violation of
the Contract Clause was that the Contract Clause must be reconciled with the "essential attributes
of sovereign power" reserved to the states. Id. at 21 (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934)). This logically means that every limitation on state or federal
power is subject to an ad hoc reasonableness test that balances the limitation against the essential
attributes of sovereign power-including the First Amendment. This seems an odd way to write
a constitution: to put things in absolute sounding language but imply an exception for all absolute
limitations in the name of sovereign necessity. Thus it was unnecessary to qualify expressly the
proscription on suspending habeas corpus or on states laying imposts and duties on imports or
exports.
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is an amendment simply defies the usual and generally accepted use of the terms
interpretation and amendment. Interpretation gives meaning to terms used in the
text to be interpreted. It does not add terms. To be faithful to the text, the Court
could have said: the word "impairing" is fairly strong; every "modification" of
contract terms is not an impairment; an "impairment" requires a modification of
a central, bargained for, undertaking of the contract.22 The Court alternatively
might have deviated from prior doctrine by concluding that only modifications of
central undertakings which are wholly unforeseeable are "impairments."23 But
within the constraints of the ordinary understanding of the meaning of words in
our language, one could not say that a "modification of the terms of a central
undertaking of a contract" is not an "impairment" (or "a law impairing the
obligation") if state exigencies require such modification. The word "impair" will
not bend so far.
The ordinary user of our language in our culture, and informed by our
legal culture, would say of such a proposed meaning: "You have given
'impairing' an entirely new meaning. You have either modified the word
When Chief Justice Hughes used the language "essential attributes of sovereignty," he was
referring to the well-established doctrine that the power of the state to regulate behavior and activity
for the public good cannot be qualified by the fact that some people may have in the past agreed
inter se to engage in the now proscribed activity. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435. By contracting into
the future one may not freeze regulation for the parties to the time of the contract. Therefore,
without qualifying the absolute language in the Contract Clause, the Court has always held that in
order for a law to impair a contract obligation it must concern the contract impaired or focus on
contracts of the kind impaired, as in Blaisdell. See also El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965)
(upholding the contract because there was no impairment); UnitedStates Trust, 431 U.S. I (striking
down an impairment). Lack of such focus caused the Court to find no violation in EnergyReserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400 (1983), and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176 (1983). In the latter two cases, the impact on contracts was simply "incidental" to a law
generally regulating behavior or activity.
22. See El Paso, 379 U.S. at 506-07, 514. Justice White's words were that "not every modification
of a contractual promise that impairs the obligation of a contract" was a violation of the Contract
Clause and that the "promise of reinstatement" lost by state enactment "was not the central
undertaking of the seller nor the primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking." Id. (emphasis
added). Therefore, to White, the "modification" was not an "impairment." See also Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398. Chief Justice Hughes began and ended with the words of the Contract Clause. His
argument for upholding amortgage moratorium act contained language defending the reasonableness
of the measures taken but emphasizing the limited nature of the intrusion on contract rights, an
intrusion not amounting to "impairing."
23. See Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. 400. Justice Blackmun noted that, because Energy
Reserves Group knew at the time of contracting that it was subject to both state and federal
regulations of prices, a change in those very regulations would not constitute the "substantial
impairment" required to trigger the contract clause. Id. at 415-16. If he had said that because the
changes were foreseeable they did not constitute an impairment within the meaning of the clause
I would not quibble, but Blackmun found warrant to add "substantial" to the constitutional language.
He then went on to add that even if a "substantial impairment" were found, it would not be
unconstitutional unless it was determined to be "unreasonable." Id. at 411-12.
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'impairing' with a word not in the text, such as 'unreasonably,' or you have
substituted another word for 'impairing' as the true word of the text." In either
event, the patient user of the interpretation will want an explanation for this
implied emendation of the text. Perhaps a satisfactory explanation can be made,
but my point here is that fidelity to text (written law, perhaps law itself, is at
stake here) forces the interpreter into a different kind of justification than one
premised in the radical pragmatism of Justice Blackmun in United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey.24 Not just the spirit or the letter alone, but the letter and spirit
taken together are essential to the idea of law.25
Holmes in Mahon makes the same mistake of ignoring the letter of the
Constitution. He said, in essence, that the state can "take private property for
public use, without just compensation"--exactly what the Constitution says it
cannot do--"but if it takes too much property without just compensation" then
it is unconstitutional.26 Remember, Mahon and, of course, now Lucas are
24. 431 U.S. 1.
25. See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 10, at 378 (referring to "a virulent form of legal pragmatism"
as "activism"). Dworkin stated that "[ain activist justice would ignore the Constitution's text, the
history of its enactment prior decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting it, and longstanding
traditions of our political culture." Id
26. The precise words Holmes used are as follows: "The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. Holmes further added: "As we already have said, this is a
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Id. at 416. He
also noted:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
Id. at 413.
As pointed out below, see infra text accompanying notes 54-71, the decision in Mahon
can be justified (and indeed was justified by Holmes in other language) as a question of kind, not
degree and thus a violation of the language of the Takings Clause ("nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V). Nothing, however,
about this constitutional language invites matters of degree except to say that a de minimus
interference might not be a "taking." But even an arguably de minimus interference with palpable
physical possession has been held to be a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Professor Lawrence Tribe criticized the decision in Loretto onjust that
ground: "This obsession with permanent physical invasions of even the most de minimus variety
borders on fetishism." LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 177 (1985) (emphasis
added). On the other hand, the language of the Due Process Clause, "nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. V, invites matters of degree
in its substantive component.
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vulnerable to the criticism that their doctrine is analytically impossible to use, that
it is seldom followed in a decisive way by courts and that it ought not to be
followed in any event. The criticism rephrased is that it cannot, has not and
ought not to be followed. I am making a different kind of criticism here. Mahon
amends the text. It amends the text without explanation of its warrant to so
amend.
Context and precedent are also important formal constraints on
interpretation. "Context," in the setting of constitutional interpretation, is not only
the rest of the constitutional text, but the historical setting of the creation of the
text and the fact that it is a constitutional, i.e., foundational, text. The
precedential gloss applied by two centuries of Supreme Court (and other court)
use, no matter how unappetizing the potpourri of recipes provided, is a constraint
of considerable depth and breadth. Obviously, inconsistent precedent ought to be
reconciled if possible, but some precedent simply will not fit, as we shall see.
Nonetheless, the main line of precedent must be followed. The idea of law
requires it."
Holmes did not explicitly state that contemplated uses of property were "rights of
property." His reference to "rights of property" was to a recognized estate in land that was
destroyed, but he proceeded on the premise (from what is quoted above) that "values incident to
property" were themselves "property" subject to being "taken" by regulation. Mahon, 260 U.S. at
413. In one phrase he recognized the distinction between "value" and "property" but then went on
to confuse that meaning into the one word "property" in the text. Id. at 414. Thus Holmes's
atextualism is dual: he ignores careful definition or any real analysis of the word "property" in the
text, and he assumes that "be taken" is a matter of degrees of interference without explaining how
the verb "to take," which does not intuitively invite such use, means "to interfere too much" in the
context of the constitutional clause.
27. Indeed, except for the diminution of value "talk" in Mahon and the recent decision in Lucas,
the United States Supreme Court doctrine has been quite consistent with text, context and precedent
and makes considerable sense as a whole, although individual opinions are often muddled. See,
e.g., Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), discussed in the text below. Commentators are fond of saying that the doctrine is in
an awful mess. See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1393 (1991), referring to our being "perplexed" by the question and "the Supreme Court's professed
inability to provide a general solution." See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles (pt. 1), 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1303-04 (1989) ("[I]t
is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); Lawrence
Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV.
569, 570 (1984).
Had Holmes not put his oar in the water in Mahon and had economic substantive due
process not been so thoroughly discredited (in part by Holmes in his famous dissent in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)), the muddled talk in individual cases would not occur. See
discussion infra part III.
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B. The Spirit of the Takings Clause
The "spirit" of any constitutional text is the set of underlying purposes
and values implied in the text. How is such spirit divined? It is certainly not
some crude original intent or founders' intent-though that, if somehow
discoverable, is relevant. It is, rather, the present people's collective intuition as
divined by the collective intuition of the Court as informed by text, context,
precedent, constitutional history, legal history, political history and social history.
It is rhetorical and argumentative. It is also important.
What is the societal intuition that informs the spirit, which is to say the
purpose and function, of the Takings Clause? It is the concept of theft. The
Takings Clause bars state theft, official theft and majoritarian theft. As the debtor
majority may not vote forgiveness of its debts," so also the less wealthy majority
may not simply award itself land and other wealth of the more fortunate
minority.29
Before examining existing formulations of the taking rules, two other
constraints of a common sense nature can be identified for the new formulation
of a takings rule, attributes which have special relationship to its being a rule of
property law as well as constitutional law. These attributes are but two aspects
of the same consideration: When government action causes a loss in property
values, compensation should be the same for all losers commensurate with the
market value of the "thing" lost at the time of its "taking" by the government.
While this proposition may seem self-evidently to be the only fair method of
determining the extent of compensation, it has two implications for
compensability which have been missed apparently by some commentators,
although not and should be added by the courts. These two implications are that
compensability must not turn on: (1) when the owner acquired the apparent right
to use the land in a certain way, which use is now "lost" because of some
28. See supra note 16.
29. Theft as to land no doubt includes the idea of trespass, an action for which a remedy exists in
common law, the ancient Writ of Trespass. Moreover, theft is a concept immanent in the state as
conservator of private ownership and private deals and transfers of ownership; the Lockean
State-what Morton Horwitz calls disparagingly the "night watchman state." HoRWITZ, supra note
4, at 19. See also LLOYD WE-REB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTCE 76-83 (1987). When the Takings
Clause was formulated and enacted in 1791, the state as conservator was its chief role and end. The
state as provider and regulator was mostly in the future. The state's role in 1791 was to preserve
existing "natural" arrangements (minus natural aggression-already condemned in John Locke's
vision by strong moral proscription, i.e., natural aggression was naturally condemned) by restoring
them through civil law and punishing gross transgressions through criminal law.
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government action;3" or (2) whether the apparent right to use the land in a certain
way (now lost) was divided from the fee simple estate in the land.31
In other words, time of acquisition and divided ownership of the fee "cut
no ice." The speculator who only owns the mineral rights in a hundred acre tract
should be in no better position to claim a compensable loss when stripping as a
method of removal of the mineral is banned than a speculator who owns the
whole fee or a farmer who owns the whole fee and has never had any intention
of strip-mining the coal in his land. Similarly speculator "A" who bought the
mineral rights in 1950 when no public ferment to ban stripping was brewing
should be treated the same as speculator "B" who bought the mineral rights in
1970 when there was such public ferment. Either the ban is compensable to both
or to neither. And this should be so, despite the fact that the price in 1970
noticeably and significantly reflected the risk of a potential ban. The same is true
of three identical parcels: one inherited in 1930 as farm land of modest value,
one bought in 1950 as farm land of modest value, and one bought in 1980 as the
potential site for a housing subdivision at fifty times the 1950 price. In 1990, all
three lots are worth 100 times the 1950 price when the housing subdivision use
is nixed by a subdivision ban. Either the ban is a taking for all three or for none.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court's doctrine is eclectic in rhetoric but less so in
results-at least until Lucas.32 The Court's rhetoric moves along three natural
paths, each having its own history and conceptual foundation. First and foremost,
there is the rhetoric of physical invasion. When the government physically
invades your property, you must be compensated. Most cases finding a taking
ultimately hinge on this basis. Indeed, Mahon can best be explained by the
rhetoric of physical invasion rather than diminution of value.33 Second in
importance is the rhetoric of governmental purpose-the harm/benefit test. If the
governmental action is aimed to eliminate an evil, then it is not a taking; if it
merely confers a benefit, it may be a taking. Third is the rhetoric of lost value
or sacrificed woth-the Holmesian rhetoric of Mahon.34 The Supreme Court
never actually decided a case on this basis until Lucas. It is nonsense, but a most
appealing nonsense.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
31. Concrete Pipe and Prods. of California Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern California, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993) (relying on Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, for the
notion that dividing the fees does not count).
32. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
33. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.
34. Id.
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I shall briefly expand on this description and in the three following
sections, critique each approach. Additionally, the Court and commentators have
sometimes talked of "balancing" and "reasonableness" as if they are part of
takings rhetoric, but such talk is plainly the rhetoric of substantive due process.
Unfortunately, economic substantive due process has been so thoroughly
discredited by the progressive judges of the post- New Deal era that nobody has
seriously made arguments under the substantive due process rubric for some sixty
years.
35
Physical invasion rhetoric is resonant with the notion that all private
property is held with the understanding, and thus the expectation, that property
in something is not absolute. Property is subject to the paramount power of the
state under three headings: eminent domain power, police power and taxing
power. Moreover, it is limited by the judicially developed doctrine of common
law nuisance.3 6 In other words, the state may force you to sell your "property,"
35. See JOHN H. GARvEY & T. ALEXANDER SEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A
READER 483-502 (1991); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34. The Court used substantive due process to
strike down a land use regulation in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), but since
then it has not been used. Since 1937 no economic regulation has been struck down under
substantive due process by the Supreme Court. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 812 (2d ed. 1991). State courts, however, regularly use substantive due process, especially
to review zoning regulations. "Constraints on municipal adoption of inefficient zoning controls
spring almost entirely from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is
construed to require that each zoning restriction be reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective." ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 63 (1981). Nonetheless, the due process language of efficiency and reasonableness is
used by the Supreme Court in upholding state legislation. See, e.g. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-
38. See infra part III.
36. For an excellent history of the development of American nuisance law, see Jeff L. Lewin,
Boomer and theAmericanLaw ofNuisance: Past, PresentandFuture, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1990).
The common law of nuisance is rooted in the notion of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("so use
your own as not to injure that of another"). William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
This meant that no matter how valuable the use of your land was to you or your community, if it
injured another, you were liable for damages or could be enjoined. "[O]n the eve of the American
Revolution, the rule of sic utere tuo provided absolute protection against interference with the
essential attributes of land ownership." Jeff L. Lewin, The Silent Revolution in West Virginia's Law
of Nuisance, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 235, 244 (1990) [hereinafter The Silent Revolution]. The
correlative proposition to this "absolute protection" was that one had an absolute limitation on the
use of one's property so as not to injure others. This could be seen as a limitation on, or
qualification of, one's property interests in the interest of others. Only an actual use (as opposed
to a contemplated future use) could be a nuisance, and thus nuisance always applied to existing or
established uses of land and the declaration by a court of the existence of a nuisance always looks
back to the beginning of the hurtful use. The court makes a finding of nuisance as a matter of fact.
Such finding has a retrospective aspect about it like all common law tort findings. The sense of
retrospectivity is a function of the vagueness of the legal standard applied, the esoteric nature of the
standard and the newness of the standard. Indeed, if the standard is novel, then it creates the same
feeling as an ex post facto law-great unfairness. But where the standard is both vague and
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the state may regulate the uses of your "property," and the state may tax your
"property," i.e., make you pay rents to the state on your property. Moreover,
your use and, to some extent, possession have been forever limited in the interests
of your neighbors and community." Whether these qualifications on property are
esoteric, as it is with nuisance, novelty can be hidden. My point and what is important to my
thesis, is that "nuisance" is fundamentally different from "police power" as a justification for
interfering with property uses. Nuisance always looks back to the beginning of existing uses; the
police power looks forward to future uses.
37. In Jackman, Justice Holmes, in upholding as not a "taking" a law allowing an actual physical
encroachment relied on the preexisting qualification on the property owner's possessory interest in
a strip of his land six inches to a foot wide on the edge of his property, rather than the Pennsylvania
Party Wall Law. "It is enough to refer to the fact also brought out and relied upon ... below, that
the custom of party walls was introduced by the first settlers in Philadelphia under William Penn
.... " Jackman, 260 U.S. at 30. That allowed Holmes to conclude:
[I]f, from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the understanding
that the burden exists, the landowner does not have the right to that part of his
land except as so qualified, and the statute that embodies that understanding
does not need to invoke the police power.
Id. at 31.
In context this shows more than Holmes's reluctance to invoke the police power to uphold
regulation against a takings claim. The taking in Jackman clearly involved a physical invasion
which ordinarily cannot be accomplished without compensation merely by invoking the police
power. (See infra part II.B). So Holmes's reluctance to use the police power was consistent with
past and future doctrine. Moreover, a preexisting qualification on the property right has always
been, and naturally seems to be, a better justification for state regulation of land use than the mere
police power: the state is merely defining and formalizing existing rights, not upsetting rights and
their attendant expectations. States will often invoke this kind of rationale injustifying a particular
regulatory measure by invoking the common law nuisance doctrine. The state will define some
existing use of property as a nuisance and thus invoke the notion that it is merely defining and
formalizing existing rights. The nuisance has all along existed; the state is simply announcing that
fact defining precisely the parameters of the nuisance and formalizing procedures to remedy the
injury. See Miller v. Shoene, 76 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Indeed, an argument can be made that that is the only way existing uses of property can be
regulated out of existence. Existing uses, I argue below, are possessory; they create fixed and
settled expectations, i.e., they are property subject to regulatory taking. The mere police power
cannot touch them. See inf!ra note 39.
The difficulty with invoking nuisance rather than a police power justification for
regulation is pointed up by contrasting "nuisance" as a preexisting qualification on preexisting
property right with the qualification in Jackman. The party wall qualification was well-established
and defined by clear understanding since colonial times. A nuisance exists only in theory-it awaits
judicial action for its definitive announcement definition and remedy. Thus when a legislative body
tries to preempt the judicial task and "declare a nuisance," judicial review of such "declaration"
ought not to be deferential. Where the court is investigating not insignificant interference with an
existing or established use of land, then a thorough judicial review of whether in fact a nuisance
existed ought to be conducted. Only in that way can the court be satisfied that a preexisting
qualification on the property right existed. Only in that way can the regulation of established uses
be justified without compensation.
Justice Scalia does exactly that in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886. Unfortunately for the Council,
(and for history, text and good sense) Scalia for the first time applies this doctrine to a
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qualifications on pre-political property rights"8 or post-political property rights 9
nonestablished use, a future use, a use in contemplation only. Such uses have always been regulated
by strict police power control subject only to a highly deferential reasonableness review in the name
of substantive due process.
38. Pre-political rights are akin to natural rights, the rights we have in a state of nature from which
John Locke and others would have us form governments. Generally they are the right to physical
integrity and to possess unmolested our land and goods. They are not a product of political choice
or political will but exist in the very nature of individual human striving within a community.
Those who believe in pre-political rights (e.g. Jefferson, Madison) believe that most of our
important rights are pre-political. See HoRWriz, supra note 4, at 196-97.
39. Post-political rights are rights embodied in legal entitlements. They are the product of political
choice and of political will. They are obviously subject to change or repeal. Those who believe
that all rights, including constitutional rights, are post-political are called legal positivists. Legal
positivism in some form or other dominates legal culture today. Professor Horwitz posits that a
shift in dominant attitude within the legal community as to the nature of property rights from their
being pre-political to post-political (he says "political," not "post-political") was necessary in order
for the Progressive Regulatory State to thrive. Holmes was foremost in leading this change.
Brandeis was close behind. But, alas, as Brandeis lamented after Mahon he was more committed
than Holmes. See supra note 6. See also HORwrrz, supra note 4, at 203-05. That shift makes no
difference in fact or theory to the development of the takings doctrine.
But see Paul, supra note 27, who believes this problem to be central to such development.
In theory, if property rights are all post-political, then the state can at any time redefine or
redesignate "property rights" by positive enactment--"you had a right to develop your land, now
you do not"-and thus there are no limits on the state's power to regulate your land (or other things
of property) save reasonableness. This translates into a very weak standard (substantive due
process) for judicial review. Thus legal positivism emasculates the Takings Clause.
But legal positivism also posits that the written constitution is positive law, and thus the
words "nor shall private property be taken for public use" must be given specific content and
applied to ordinary enactments. A positivist can comfortably interpret that language to mean that
when the state says a particular claim rises to the level of being "property" then it is not changeable
without due process (substantive or procedural) and without compensation. The positive words of
the constitution must be followed. The word "property" can be said to be some sort of natural
concept with a "true" content or at least a historically "true" content (i.e. is a pre-political idea not
subject to political change) or it can be said to be a social construct, a mere convention. Moreover,
part of the received convention is that property is an idea of central importance to social life and
that once the label "property" attaches it cannot be altered except as constitutionally prescribed. In
other words, whether the concept is a natural one or a conventional one once it attaches, change can
only be by a constitutionally prescribed way.
The development of civil procedural due process is an example of this. After Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a state-created entitlement was thought to be included in the concept
of property such that one could not be deprived of an entitlement without a fair process, and, while
the state could place prospective substantive qualification(s) on the entitlement (including destroying
it), the state could not retroactively destroy it and the state could not qualify the entitlement with
processes for determining its individual instan~el that are deemed by the court to be unfair. See
Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest
in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.") Id. at 167 (emphasis added). Powell's
statement became doctrine in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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makes no difference; the expectation of owners is the same-the state may take,
regulate, tax or declare noisome the things of property. The restrictions on these
qualifications in the name of limited government, the Lockean social contract, or
the rights of free citizens are that takings must be for public use and justly
compensated, that regulation must be reasonable and that taxing must be based
on reasonable classifications.4" Thus, the "Takings Clause" is, at least principally,
a limitation on eminent domain power, and this clause is often called the Eminent
Domain41 or Just Compensation Clause.42
The Court's physical invasion rhetoric is an attempt to separate taking
property, which must be compensated, from the regulation of property, for which
no compensation is necessary so long as the intrusion is reasonable. The
following intuitive reasoning explains this separation: If the state may regulate
the things of property, it obviously must be the human uses of such things that
the state may limit or ban. This logically invites a separation between "uses" and
"things." Because it is deeply embedded in our legal culture that "property" is
not exactly the "thing"'43 (although the word "property" is very often used this
way), we say "property" is rather a right or set of claims in the "thing." Now,
that set will include claims to use the things of property in an infinite variety of
ways, many or most of which will affect other human beings and their "things"
of property and thus may be regulated. The claims to use are thus modifiable.44
The claim to the thing itself is not subject to regulation but only to confiscation.
The right to the thing itself versus the right to use the thing is thus the line
between expropriation (eminent domain) and regulation. This distinction is the
basis for the physical invasion test.
40. Brushaver v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (upholding a progressive income tax);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding a progressive federal inheritance tax).
41. See, e.g., GARvEY & SEINIKOFF, supra note 35, at 254.
42. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 26, at 179.
43. "Things" of property are usually, or at least most commonly, thought of as physical (land,
chattels); there are many intangible "things" of property-the going concern worth of a business,
its good will, for one.
44. They should perhaps be called privileges and not rights. See HORwrrz, supra note 4, at 152-
56, explaining Wesley N. Hohfeld's famous fundamental jural relationships. For example, Horwitz
states:
The right of ownership in a manufacturing plant is, to use Hohfeld's terms, a
privilege to operate the plant, plus a privilege not to operate it, plus a right to
keep others from operating it, plus a power to acquire all the rights of
ownership in the products. The analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. Having
exercised his power to acquire ownership of the products, the owner has a
privilege to use them, plus a much more significant right to keep others from
using them, plus apower to change the duty thereby implied in the others, into
a privilege coupled with rights.
Id. at 164 (quoting Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22
COLUM. L. REv. 209, 214 (1922)).
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Physical invasion is a way of talking about affecting rights to the thing
itself as opposed to rights to use the thing. Rights to the thing itself are captured
by the word "possession," and we can talk of possessory property rights or "core"
property rights. The rights to use, are non-possessory interests or perhaps
"privileges" or "powers."45 So the physical invasion test is a way of drawing the
takings line by focusing on the kind of property interest that is being altered by
the governmental action. It is intuitively very appealing. The distinction between
possession and use seems obvious and simple to mark out. Of course, it's not so
simple to "mark out" as our later discussion will explore-but for the time being,
note that the physical invasion test focuses on the kind of property interest being
affected.
By contrast, the harm/benefit rhetoric focuses on the kind of governmental
power being exercised. The simple premise is that the exercise of eminent
domain power is subject to the just compensation principle, while the exercise of
the police power must only be reasonable. In the nineteenth century, the police
power, which we now think of as simply the power of internal or domestic
regulation, was circumscribed by a set of limiting concepts. Thus, it could be
defined as the power to protect "public health, safety, morals and general
welfare." Perhaps the most important word in the nineteenth century was
"protect" as contrasted with "promote." In any event, the police power was the
power to prevent, mitigate or cure social ills-evil was its target.46 On the other
hand, eminent domain was exercised to acquire resources to benefit the public.
Generally, the exercise of one power or the other took a distinct form such that
looking at the form of legislative action would tell a court whether to use the Just
Compensation Clause or the Due Process Clause. A regulatory act does not look
like an expropriation bill. Thus we have an easy way to sort out the cases. But
what if a clever legislature used the form of regulation to achieve the ends of
eminent domain? Thus instead of attacking an evil, it confers a benefit on the
public but without having to pay for the benefit. The courts ought to be vigilant
against such craft. Alas, as we shall see below, the harm/benefit distinction is
much less satisfactorily marked out than the use/possession distinction.
Finally, the rhetoric of lost value cares not about distinctions between
kinds of property interests or kinds of governmental action but about degrees of
lost value. Its remarkable appeal in the face of daunting conceptual and
functional objections is that it gets us where our sense of justice lives-in our
pocket books. What hurts about onerous property regulations is not so much the
loss of use or possession of land or chattels, but the loss of their value. Indeed,
this is a truism. So why not focus on the value lost when testing regulation for
a Takings Clause violation? In America most things of property, that is things
that can be owned, can be traded, so we have a ready measure of our lost
45. See infra note 47.
46. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 29 (1904).
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value-the lost market value.47 Since the loss of market value is what
discomforts us when government regulates, the constitutionality of regulation
ought to be tested by loss of market value. But because government regulation
affects the market value of the things we own in a myriad of ways, every loss of
market value cannot be a taking.4" So how much loss is enough? That's the hard
part. "At least it must be a taking if all market value is lost."'49 When all market
value is destroyed by regulation, then the state must compensate. But that's not
much of a rule because regulation will essentially never destroy all market value.
In law, however, "all" seldom remains unmodified-first "essentially all," then
"substantially all." Logically if the loss of "all" is compensable, why should
"almost all" not be compensated? And if "almost all" why not "almost, almost
all" and so forth. So the all/some line will break down unless there is some
reason, beyond needing a bright line, to sustain it. One reason for a pristine
all/some line which might be suggested is that when one loses all valuable uses
of one's land, one is effectively dispossessed-i.e., the value test becomes a
possession/usetest. But, if the loss of all valuable uses is an ouster of possession,
then why is not the loss of almost all valuable uses not a partial ouster, and even
minuscule ousters of possession are compensable.
Thus, the value lost test (diminution of value) is left in a true dilemma:
either it draws a "logical" all/some line which cannot be otherwise justified and
which will, in any event, decide no cases, or it draws an arbitrary "some
percentage" line which for several reasons described in the next section, makes
no sense even beyond its mere arbitrariness.
B. The Rhetoric of Property Concepts: The Physical Invasion Test
As suggested above, the dominant rhetoric of takings cases elaborates a
theory of property rights in order to distinguish between legal interests in things
that are subject to the Eminent Domain Clause and those that can be regulated
without exercising eminent domain and its requirement ofjust compensation. The
argument from historically established property concepts is as follows:
Possessory interests in things can be bought and sold, whether the possession is
partial or complete, temporary or permanent. "Use interests" in things are rarely
bought and sold separate from possession. The particular use of things possessed
can be a condition of possession, but the consequence of violating the condition
is usually loss of possession. Although there are ways to configure use so that
it too can be the subject of alienation, usually to allow another person "to use"
47. "Just" compensation for the "taking of private property for public use," has uniformly been held
to be its "fair market value." See 8 PHILLIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14E.02
(Julius Sackman ed.) (rev. 3d ed. 1973).
48. Justice Holmes, of course, conceded this in Mahon.
49. See supra note 6 and quotation from Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908). See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
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one's "property" is to turn some part of possession over to that person. Thus, the
notion of the saleability of uses is the exceptional case-an occasional servitude
or covenant. Possession is thus associated with transferability; it's the "right" to
the "thing" that is transferred. The "thing" transferred is usually physical, and
transfer is associated with the change of physical dominion. Even an easement
is a right to a certain physical presence.
Thus, anything that physically invades land or other "things" of property
is an interference with possession and hence with "the" property itself. For the
state to authorize or legitimize a physical invasion without the owner's consent
is to take the property-to take possession of and dominion over some part of the
thing itself. That taking of possession always requires payment when the
government is not involved. If it is not paid for, such taking is called theft or
trespass.
Thus, when government action causes the flooding of private land, the
owner is physically ousted from his land. Technically, the owner owns the space,
but the space now has something not of the owner's choosing. The land is now
possessed by the water. The water is a clear instrument of trespass.5 Similarly,
if airplanes fly low over a farmer's house and barns, his air space is physically
invaded."' He still owns the space, but someone not of his choosing is occupying
the space, even if very briefly. If the flyovers are regular, then an easement has
been taken and easements must be paid for. Almost every case finding a taking
by the United States Supreme Court can be explained in the aforementioned
fashion. Even Mahon52 falls in this category. The apparent exception to the rule
is Lucas.'3
1. Mahon as a Physical Invasion Case
But how does Mahon fall into this category? Mahon seems like a "use"
rather than a "possession" case. After all, the Kohler Ac5 "forbids the mining
of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things,
any structure used as a human habitation, with certain exceptions, including
[among the exceptions] land where the surface is owned by the owner of the
underlying coal." '55 In other words, where the surface is owned by another, one
may not use the land so as to cause the surface to subside. The owner of the coal
still "owns" the coal; nobody and no thing interferes physically with the coal
underground. The owner simply may not use his subsurface possession, the
50. Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
51. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84
(1962).
52. 260 U.S. 393.
53. 112 S. Ct. 2886.
54. Kohler Act, Pub. L. 1198 (1921) (codified at 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 661-71 (1966)).
55. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
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owned thing, so as to cause injury to another person's property. Indeed, the
prohibited use is the removal of the thing possessed. Under the ground it has no
value at all except to hold up the surface. So having to leave it in the ground
makes it totally worthless to someone who does not also own the surface. From
this idea, one can easily see what prompted the "diminution-in-value" idea. The
coal owner can possess his coal (his deed is still good) and sell it in the ground,
but he cannot remove it, so the possession is worthless.
It would appear that in applying the classic possession/use test, the Kohler
Act is a mere exercise of the police power and thus not subject to the Just
Compensation Clause unless one can say that possession that is worthless is no
possession at all.56 (But Holmes does not put it quite that way.57) The Kohler Act
is simply a proscription of certain activity on land that will cause injury to
someone else's land. The only difference between this case and the standard "use
your land so as not to injure others" case is that the "other land" is configured
vertically not horizontally.
Up to this point, it would appear that in order to conclude that the Kohler
Act works a "taking," something other than the possession/use line of the
traditional physical invasion test must be used. And if the adjacent land (here
vertically contiguous) that is injured was the subject of an unqualified property
right (like two horizontally adjacent fee simple lots without mutual covenants)
then a new non-traditional test would be necessary if the result desired were to
find the Act unconstitutional. But the adjacent land protected by the Kohler Act
ban is qualified, for the deed granting the ownership interest in the surface "in
express terms reserves the right to remove all the coal under the same and the
grantee takes the premises with the risk and waives all claim for damages that
may arise from mining out the coal." '58 So what the surface owners "possessed"
was a surface of land subject to a particular transformation and disfigurement, i.e.
they owned a fragile surface, a house built on sand.59
Now property in land is the rights to possession and use contained in the
deed conveying the land-no more, no less. The description usually is of
horizontal physical space only-metes and bounds. Horizontal spatial domain is
the usual meaning of possession, thus the literal physical invasion. But deeds
often describe temporal domain which have contingent conditions (e.g., the
56. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 6, quotation from Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908),
and Holmes's opinion in Mahon.
58. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
59. He is like a man who had the sense to build his house on rock. But what of the
man who hears these words of mine and does not act upon them? He is like a
man who was foolish enough to build his house on sand. The rain came down,
the floods rose, the wind blew, and beat upon that house; down it fell with a
great crash.
Matthew 7:26, Luke 6:46-49 (New English Bible).
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condition subsequent). Moreover, spatial domain may have vertical
dimension-i.e., the coal underground is excepted from your domain. The usual
assumption of owning from the sky to the center of the earth is thus excepted.
Because the coal supports the surface and because coal in the ground is of no
value except to support the surface, there is an obvious conflict as to what is
really possessed between a surface owner and a subjacent owner. The deed may
or may not resolve the conflict.6 If the deed resolves the conflict, that resolution
is part of the description of what is possessed-just like metes and bounds. The
deed tells the grantee, "you have not an acre of rock, you have an acre of sand."
Because the grantee knows that he owns ("possesses") only what the deed
describes, the grantee pays for sand, not rock. Moreover, the coal owner from
his complementary deed knows that he possesses "removable coal," not "subjacent
support coal," and pays for what he gets.
Now if the state came along and said, "Look, I know, you coal owners
possess a lot of what you call 'removable coal,' but the activity of removal is
going to cause damage to a great number of people and their property (what we
call the general public). Most of those people that will be harmed by your
removal do not have a deed that says they bought only sand. In order to avoid
this harm to the general public, we ban your removal activity." This is a classic
exercise of the police power-a regulation of land use requiring no compensation.
But as Holmes and seven other judges read the Kohler Act, it did not ban
use in order to benefit the general public, but only that part of the public that had
bought "sand." The evil was that they had bought only "sand," and they wanted
"rock." The cure was to transfer, through a law that appeared to regulate use
only, rock to the sand owner without the sand owner paying or the rock owner
being paid. The rock owner loses; the sand owner gains. It looks like the rock
owner's property has been taken. With less metaphor, the possessor of coal has
his valuable removable coal physically transformed into supporting rock that is
worthless to him, while the fragile surface possessor is awarded supporting rock
he had not previously possessed. Theft pure and simple!
This statement clarifies Holmes's interpretation of the Kohler Act:
A source of damage to [a single private] house is not a public
nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different
places. The damage is not common or public. The extent of the
public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the
statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is
owned by the owner of the coal.61
60. If the deed does not resolve the conflict, then a court or legislature will, if asked, resolve the
dispute as the decision maker thinks justice or the public good requires.
61. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14 (citation omitted).
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He concludes: "So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the
risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has
become a danger warrants the giving to them [of] greater rights than they
bought."62 Holmes makes it clear from the above that he believed that the Kohler
Act was not aimed to benefit (or prevent harm to) the general public, but only
that small part of the public (Holmes would say not the public at all but a set of
private persons) that had bought and now owned only a soft surface. The Kohler
Act was a naked transfer of one private person's physical property, "moveable
coal," to another private person as "rock foundation" without payment-a transfer
of the thing itself and not merely a ban on the use of the physical thing.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Mahon, used the pure rhetoric of the
possession/use distinction.63 He paid little attention to Holmes's conclusion that
the Kohler Act was not designed to benefit the general public, but rather was
designed to benefit only a subgroup of private owners. Brandeis assumed that
Congress designed the Kohler Act to prevent harm to the general public." "But
where the police power is exercised, not to confer benefits upon property owners,
but to protect the public"65 is one statement among several that directly
contradicts the basic premise of Holmes's opinion. Brandeis, however, failed to
62. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The
property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The State does
not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner
from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Id.
64. Brandeis used the word "public" numerous times, always implicitly meaning the general public.
However, the following is the only reference that he makes as to why the Kohler Act was intended
to benefit the general public:
This case involves only mining which causes subsidence of a dwelling house.
But the Kohler Act contains provisions in addition to that quoted above ....
These provisions deal with mining under cities to such an extent as to cause
subsidence of-
(a) Any public building or any structure customarily used by the
public as a place of resort, assemblage, or amusement, including, but not being
limited to, churches, schools, hospitals, theaters, hotels, and railroad stations.
(b) Any street, road, bridge, or other public passageway, dedicated to
public use or habitually used by the public.
(c) Any track, roadbed, right of way, pipe, conduit, wire, or other
facility, used in the service of the public by any municipal corporation or public
service company as defined by the Public Service Company Law.
A prohibition of mining which causes subsidence of such structures
and facilities is obviously enacted for a public purpose; and it seems, likewise,
clear that mere notice of intention to mine would not in this connection secure
the public safety.
Id. at 421-22.
65. Id. at 422.
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make a convincing argument as to how the general public was benefited by the
Kohler Act.66 Had Brandeis pitched his argument to persuade his colleagues that
the general public was benefited, perhaps his dissent would not have been solo.
Given the Kohler Act, perhaps that was a hard argument to make.67 On the other
hand, given the rest (and "arresting" part) of Holmes's argument pitched in the
new rhetoric of diminution of value, perhaps Brandeis missed the critical
importance of the "general public/select subset" distinction made by Holmes.
That distinction is not, after all, crucial to a pure diminution of value theory.68
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,69 the Court
found specifically that the general public benefited from prohibiting mining so as
to cause subsidence; the prohibition was not designed to, nor did it, prevent harm
only to "soft surface" owners.7" Thus, although the prohibition has the effect of
returning to soft surface owners what they had bargained away, that was not its
purpose at all. The Act prohibited the use of the land in order to protect the
general public; the return of property without compensation was incidental and
of no importance. The state cannot be prevented in, or inhibited from, stopping
harmful activity because some private arrangements about that activity are thereby
upset.7
1
66. Such arguments could have been plausibly made and were, to some extent, made by Brandeis.
See supra note 64. Nonetheless, the Kohler Act's exemption of combined ownership of surface and
mineral rights property from its proscription on mining that might cause subsidence strongly
suggests that the legislature was not concerned with the harm to the general public caused by any
subsidence of surface areas, but only that subsidence which hurts the surface owners who had given
up the right to subjacent support. The ordinary rule (cited by Brandeis) that private parties cannot
by their private dealings foreclose the regulation of behavior in the public interest (which applies
to the Contract Clause as well as the Takings Clause) seems not to apply to the Kohler Act because
it appears, by its exemption, to focus on the private dealings (a classic impairment of the obligation
of contracts) or, put another way, to be concerned only with that small part of the public who where
privy to the private dealings. Brandeis needed to explain away the exemption and otherwise
emphasize more than he did the ways that the general public is injured, in fact, by surface
subsidence. "The injury to me caused by my neighbor's house collapsing" was perhaps so manifest
to the communitarian-minded Brandeis that he could not believe that his more individualistic
brothers did not agree.
67. See supra note 66.
68. Indeed, it is entirely irrelevant to the diminution-in-value theory. See infra part II.D. One can
only guess that it was the glaring novelty and wrongheadedness of the seemingly decisive
diminution of value theory that caused Brandeis to focus on that theory as well as the apostasy of
his fellow progressive implied in that theory. See supra note 6.
69. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
70. See id. at 485-89 (discussing the difference between the Kohler Act and the Subsidence Act).
71. "The rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his
property into surface and subsoil." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
majority in Mahon would have agreed with this essentially unassailable rule.
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2. Use of Land as Possession Subject to Physical Invasion
Even though most cases can be explained by the possession/use
distinction, the distinction becomes somewhat problematic in cases where land
seems to be possessed literally by a use. Any development of land is a use of the
land that transfigures the space in a more or less permanent way-the use
becomes attached to the land. Instruments of title often do not reflect this
attached use. I use my land as a dwelling site by attaching a house thereto. I
seem to possess the land with my house. Under the law of real property, the
house becomes part of the land.
However, there are two types of established developmental uses, one less
possessory than the other. One is the attached structures or modifications of the
land resulting from development, and the other is the daily activities that go on
in those attachments. 2 The latter is clearly a use subjected to police power
regulation. However, in most zoning litigation,73 the prohibition or phase out of
non-conforming, preexisting uses, even of the structural variety, is judged by a
reasonableness test74 even though many mumble about a "taking."'75 Moreover,
if the conclusion is that the law is unreasonable, a state court will sometimes
declare a violation of the Takings Clause rather than a violation of substantive
due process.
Where the use by structural modification (or activity) is in the future, no
taking of property occurs under the possession/use test even where the market
value of the property has been substantially enhanced by the contemplated use.
Perhaps a violation of due process takes place, but that is a different constitutional
constraint with a different test and different remedies.
3. When Use Becomes Possession: The Distinct Investment-Backed Expectation
There may be some difficult questions as to whether a proposed use has
been sufficiently established such that it gives the property owner a "vested
right," as many state courts call it,76 in the proposed use. The idea of "distinct
investment-backed expectations" is appropriately used here to determine whether
72. SeeHarbison v. City of Buffalo, 152N.E.2d 42,46 (N.Y. 1958) (non-conforming structure can
be phased out by gauging it to the "normal life" of the structure); Harris v. Mayor of Baltimore,
371 A.2d 706, 710-12 (Md. 1977).
73. ELLIcKsoN & TARLOCK, supra note 35, at 212.
74. See Harris, 371 A.2d at 710.
75. "Mumbling about taking" is no doubt a function of the regulation appearing to upset a
"possessory use"--possession of the land with the structure.
76. See ELLICKsoN & TARLOCK, supra note 35, at 203-07. See e.g., Clackamas County v. Holmes,
508 P.2d 190, 192-94 (1973) (finding that the landowners had made sufficient investments and
improvements to establish a vested right prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance).
77. See Agins v. Tiburin, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 127. The
phrase is used in these cases but not in the limited way suggested here.
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enough activity has taken place to say that a "contemplated use" has been
sufficiently established that it is now part of the property and cannot be prohibited
without paying the owner for its loss. One thing state courts do not do is count
the price enhancement of the lot due to the contemplated use (often a huge
percentage of the lot's value) as a "distinct investment-backed expectation."78 To
count the lot price enhancement as a "distinct investment-backed expectation" (the
common sense thing to do after all) would either reward recentness of purchase
and call for treating similar parcel owners differently79 or abandon totally the
search for determining when a use becomes possessory (and thus "property") and
to embrace the diminution-of-value theory.
For example, take two identical contiguous lots each worth $1 million as
apartment sites and each worth $20,000 if no development is allowed at all. One
lot was bought in 1992 for $1,000,000; the other was inherited in 1952 by the
present owner. If you count the 1992 purchase price as a "distinct investment-
backed expectation" which shows that the buyer has begun the contemplated
apartment use such that it is now "vested" (or, as I have suggested, is now part
of the "possession" of the lot), then the 1992 purchaser is allowed to build (or get
damages) while the 1952 inheritor must suffer his 98% loss of value. If this
example seems unfair so that you also count the 1952 inheritor's loss of
$980,000 as a "distinct investment-backed expectation," then the "distinct
investment-backed expectation" cannot be used to infer the beginning of a
development project such that it is an established use. Rather the loss of value
is itself lamented. It appears to be a loss of most of the inheritor's "property" (as
with the 1992 purchaser), and thus, under a diminution of value theory, recovery
should be had. But to recover you would have had to switch theories from
"possession/use" to "loss of value," and loss of value rhetoric makes no sense as
a "takings" theory, as I began to show above and will elaborate on below. Loss
of value rhetoric necessarily converts every potential use of a thing of property
into property itself, and lost is the possession/use distinction necessary to the
regulatory state-necessary to the solving of collective problems through
legislation.
78. ELLICKSON & TARLOCK, supra note 35, at 204: The authors ask the question, "Why do most
courts ignore the developer's land acquisition costs in these [establishing an 'established use' as a
'vested right'] cases?" Id. In Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 557 P.2d 532 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1976), land acquisition costs were allowed as the kind of investment that counts toward
establishing an "established use." Paradise Valley, 557 P.2d at 540. However, the $1.1 million
spent for land acquisition was "[i]n reliance upon the issuance of this permit [a 'Special Use Permit'
authorizing development of the property, 18.84 acres, as a resort hotel of 148 three-room suites]"
to Gulf Leisure who then exercised an option procured in 1971 and purchased the property for $1.1
million. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
79. See supra part I.B.
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4. Established Uses that Are Too Bad To Be Possessory
As suggested above, some established uses are possessory but can be
phased out through regulation if compatible with their own normal life cycle.8"
But some uses can be put to death immediately because they never become
possessory, despite appearances, due to the fact that they are so obviously harmful
to the public. These harmful uses are of two kinds: activities on land (as
opposed to appurtenant structures) that the owner ought to know from their
general character are viewed as so harmful to the health, safety, morality, peace
and general welfare of the community as to be subject to future prohibition.
These are not "private nuisances" because they do not cause identifiable harm to
neighboring land or its occupants. The harm is to the general public and,
therefore, a public nuisance or a potential public nuisance. Mugler v. Kansas,8
one of the Supreme Court's earliest regulatory taking cases, is a prime example
of this non-possessory use. When a use is not fixed to the land by structure or
otherwise, it never seems like "property"--a term conceptually tied to a physical
thing. The activity of distilling liquor, as in Mugler, does not require special land
or structures that cannot be built most anywhere. It, therefore, seems
conceptually more like the regulation of mere activity than a regulation, let alone
a taking of property.
The second kind of non-possessory established uses are those that are
similar to private nuisances in that they put a would-be developer on notice that
some structural changes may not be forever lawful, i.e., the communities'
apparent condoning of a use by the absence of positive prohibition may not be
permanent. Prime examples of this are cases such as Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead82 and Hadacheck v. Sebastian,3 where the Court upheld the regulatory
outlawing of a longstanding gravel pit84 and a seven-year-old brickyard that
predated the housing development with which it was incompatible."
A case like Miller v. Schoene,86 which upheld the uncompensated87
destruction of an established use, is more problematic because the established use
(a grove of ornamental trees) gives little notice to the owner that it might be a
public or private nuisance. But most of the trees that were ordered destroyed
80. See supra note 72.
81. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
82. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
83. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
84. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595-97.
85. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 412-14.
86. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
87. The cost of removing the trees was paid by the state, and the landowner retained the cut trees.
What was not compensated was the loss in value to the land which, according to the state court, was
small. Miller v. State Entomologist, 135 S.E. 813, 818-19 (Va. 1926); aff d sub nom., Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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were indigenous and not cultivated. Thus "distinct investment-backed
expectations" were not involved in Miller.88 Moreover, the lower court found that
the trees added little to the value of the land. In any event, the Virginia
legislature declared the red cedar trees to be a "public nuisance" within two miles
of any apple orchard and that they must be abated at the behest of "ten
freeholders."89  Thus, relying on the idea that a fixed use of land that is a
nuisance can be abated without full compensation to the owner, the legislature
declared the red cedars to be a nuisance. Implicit in all this is that one never
owns a property interest in even an established use of land where such use is a
nuisance, even if it is not declared a nuisance until after the use has been
established. It is in the nature of the concept of nuisance that it is a "fact" to be
discovered and declared, not a rule to be created.9" Moreover, even though the
legislature declared it to be a public nuisance instead of a private nuisance
(legislatures cannot declare private nuisances, only courts can), it was in the
nature of a private nuisance because it injured neighboring property holders.91
5. Established Uses That Are Too Good To Be Possessory
Where an established structural use is so "good"9 2 that the state will not
allow the owner to destroy, modify or allow deterioration of the structure,
physical invasion analysis would appear to find a taking. The interference with
physical possession is almost palpable. Indeed, the owner is compelled to possess
his property (to occupy the space in exclusive dominion) with something not of
her choosing. This would be as physically invasive as requiring an owner to raze
an established structure-an interference that is seldom required or upheld." But
with a razed structure, the owner can at least start anew. Thus, landmark
preservation laws seem vulnerable to a taking claim.
The creators of such acts felt the need to guard against this vulnerability
by mitigating the loss. The acts provide careful procedures and generous non-
88. One property owner had planted a row of red cedars on either side of his driveway and distinct
investment-backed development of an existing valuable use was lost. Id. at 819. Nonetheless, that
existing use was a nuisance waiting to be declared, and therefore no possessory property interest in
that use existed.
89. Id. at 814 n.1 (quoting § 886 of the Virginia Code).
90. See supra note 36.
91. Like a private nuisance, it could be abated only at the behest of private citizens, the ten
freeholders. See supra note 88.
92. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Penn Central is prevented from
further developing its property basically because too good ajob was done in designing and building
it." Id. at 146.
93. "[N]early all zoning ordinances provide that a use may continue if it lawfully preexists the
adoption of a zoning ordinance .... " DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 114 (2d ed. 1986). I can find no cases where
existing structures are ordered destroyed because they are non-conforming uses.
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monetary compensatory concessions9-but not cash. Such procedures and non-
monetary compensation were sufficient in state court to preserve New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law against a claim by Penn Central Transportation
Company. Penn Central argued that not being allowed to build its chosen
structure over Grand Central Station was a taking without just compensation."
But Justice Brennan denied that non-monetary compensation was the basis for the
decision to uphold the Act.96 Rather, Justice Brennan turned to substantive due
process articulated in eclectic takings rhetoric.97
Can one defend the result in Penn Central against a physical invasion
argument? Try this. The established use of the property is not disturbed:
"[Grand Central Station's] designation as a landmark not only permits but
contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has
been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space
and concessions."98 It would appear that forced razing is much different from not
allowing razing. Requiring razing physically interferes with an established use-a
use that is fixed and settled. But requiring a fixed and settled use to continue is
like forbidding a land owner to fill an estuary; it is simply a disallowance of
future uses-all future uses except the present use. The Landmark Preservation
Act is environmental legislation-by disturbing the present environment of the
city, the lot owner-developer will upset the ecology-an urban, human ecology,
to be sure, but ecology nonetheless: New York City would not be the same
without Grand Central Station. It is an organic part of the interdependent life of
the city and is a landmark. Once the requirement that Grand Central Station be
maintained is seen not as a physical invasion (because it is not a disturbance of
94. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), afjd sub nom., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
95. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 120-22.
96. Id. at 122; but see id. at 137.
97. Id. at 136 ("[W]hat must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use
of the parcel.").
98. Id. "[C]ontemplates" in this quotation is a somewhat misleading term, "requires" would be
more accurate. But apparently having to maintain an existing use was not claimed by Penn Central
as a taking. Id. at 129. Given Penn Central's argument that it was the loss of the right to exploit
developmentally the airspace above the Grand Central Station building, "contemplates" seems
appropriate. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist seemed to feel that having-to-continue-an-
existing-use was his long suit, but his partner, Penn Central, would not bid it. Id. at 146; see also
id. at 152.
On the other hand, future uses, his shorter suit, was biddable because future uses are,
according to Rehnquist, "substantial property rights" within the meaning of "property" in the
Takings Clause. Id. at 142-44 (citing United States v. General Motors Co., 323 U.S. 373 (1945);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878)). These "just compensation" cases determine what part
of the loss to the owner must be compensated. Of course, once a loss of possession is
acknowledged, then it is clear that the market value of that lost possession includes contemplated
uses that the market has always recognized in setting the current value. "Just compensation" must
include the full value of the property taken. Id. at 143 n.6.
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the established use, i.e. the possessory property), then no taking can be based on
physical invasion; the regulation of the airspace above Grand Central Station is
simply a regulation of use and not of property. The regulation is subject to
substantive due process-but the carefully crafted Landmark Preservation Act
easily passed muster. Justice Brennan was right after all.
6. A Critical Summary of Physical Invasion Rhetoric
The rhetorical analysis of property concepts resolves most regulatory
taking claims in favor of the regulation and against the claim of taking. The
analysis draws a conceptual line between the possession of property and its use,
separating the concepts of "possession" and "use" as they are intuitively held in
our culture (including, but not limited to, our legal culture). In fact, the Supreme
Court, through its physical invasion test, has upheld most regulations against
taking claims and has been faithful to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Although the results reached through this rhetoric are politically satisfying
to progressive judges (those who believe in the regulatory state), its methodology
can seem retrograde. This rhetoric of concepts, mere conceptualism, seems a
throwback to classical legal thought, to nineteenth century natural law formalism.
To progressive judges, such conceptualism, is a creaking, smelly old bus which
may get them where they want to go, but it's a most unsatisfactory trip. It is
underdeveloped as a rhetoric of explanation. (Brennan made a mess of it in Penn
Central; Holmes would not use it in Mahon.) I have tried to develop it to show
that it plausibly explains every case.
The Court has sought a modem functional approach. It wants to explain
its results in terms of the function of the Takings Clause. Its meaning should be
spelled out in terms of its purpose, in terms of the human values it serves. The
following two sections show that the Supreme Court's doctrinal rhetoric of
functionalism for the Takings Clause has been an abject failure-if the rhetoric
of benefit/harm or diminution of value can be called functional approaches at all.
These approaches have led to Lucas!
C. The Rhetoric of Governmental Purpose: The Harm/Benefit Test
An alternative way to conceptualize the takings issue is as a clash
between governmental powers. When a constitutional government of limited
powers acts, it must exercise a specific power. So the issue of the
constitutionality of any governmental action must begin by asking, "which power
is being exercised?" Then the further questions can be asked: "does the acting
governmental unit have such power, and, if it does, what limitations are there on
the exercise of the power?" For instance, the eminent domain power can be
exercised only for public use and by paying just compensation. Similarly, the
police power may be exercised only if the resulting regulation is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The issue as to which power is
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being exercised turns on the concepts of the powers. So the rhetoric involves
analyzing the concepts of eminent domain, police power, taxing power.
The argument takes this form: The regulation of a use of land purports
to be an exercise of the police power, but the goal of the police power is to
eliminate harm to the public. The instant regulation does not purport to eliminate
harm because it requires the maintenance of an existing use, as in a landmark
preservation case. Therefore, the government must have found that the existing
use is beneficial to the public. The instant regulation, therefore, confers the
continuation of a beneficial use to the public at the expense of the property
owner. Thus, it is not the exercise of the police power. Rather, it is the exercise
of eminent domain power, which is the power to confer benefits on the public by
obtaining things for public use. Under eminent domain, "obtaining" must be by
"buying." To take or seize property is unconstitutional.
In other words, when governmental activity does "good" for the public,
losses occasioned thereby must be paid for, but when it stops "bad" from injuring
the public, nothing need be paid to the losers. Thus stated, the theory is self-
refuting: stopping an "evil" use surely confers a more beneficial use on society.
The conferring of a beneficial use is more attractive than others deemed less
beneficial to society. The choice of a socially non-beneficial use by a private
owner in defiance of a more socially beneficial use surely is bad. For example,
if a railroad is required to build an overpass over a highway, is it being required
to confer a benefit on the public of a safer, more comfortable highway, or is it
being required to abate an obnoxious safety hazard?99 Is the prohibition of
brickmaking in a residential neighborhood conferring a benefit of a noiseless,
smoke-and-dust-free neighborhood or abating a noisy, dusty, i.e., evil, use of
property that interferes with others?... Does the requirement of the preservation
of a landmark structure on private property confer a benefit of continued beauty
or prevent the evil of losing treasured beauty, social continuity and ties with the
past?
This theory turns on semantics of the glass-half-filled-or-half-empty
variety. Moreover, it is a semantic difference which poorly checks majoritarian
abuse of power. In any public debate over whether to restrict the use of property,
each side will not only contend that the desired use will produce greater net
satisfaction or happiness for society but will likely characterize the opposing use
as evil and its advocates as evil people. The debate in the 1970s over the banning
of strip mining certainly produced such rhetoric. The winner of such debate-the
side which produces a majority in its favor-will probably have convinced people
that the opposite use is "evil" or "bad." In other words the majority will define
99. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 413 (1935); see also
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
100. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394. See also Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery
stables in a congested commercial zone).
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"evil." "The loss of historical landmarks is bad." "The erosion of beaches is
bad." In a democracy, the public designation of evil is a political question
determined by majority rule. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the courts,
especially an elected state court, will share the majority's characterization or
simply defer to it. Without more, the benefit-harm test upholds majoritarian
power.101
Professor Frank Michelman has suggested that the core of the truth of the
harm/benefit rule lies elsewhere. 2 There is evil about which there is nearly
unanimous agreement such that it is safe for a court to allow constitutional cases
to turn on it-theft for example. It may be that the majoritarian purpose in
passing a particular regulation is not to maximize net social benefits by adjusting
the market's allocation of resources; it may be to undo a theft. For example, if
a quiet, peaceful, but unzoned, residential neighborhood is invaded by a noisy,
dirty industrial plant, then that plant steals the peace and comfort of the
neighboring land users. However, the crux of the evil in this example turns on
something that the harm/benefit test does not purport to deal with: time. The
crucial thing to the existence of theft is who had possession first. The metaphor
"pig in the parlor"'0 3 by itself simply states a conflict in the use of space. It
becomes a theft situation only if the added fact is given that the pig was brought
into the parlor. A regulation forbidding "pigs in the parlor" would require no
compensation to the pig owner deprived of the use of the parlor to house his pig.
But if the pig were in a barnyard and the parlor was built in the barnyard around
the pig, then the builder is the thief and the regulation forbidding pigs in parlors
would require compensation to the pig owner. Although Michelman makes a
valiant effort to find some saving fairness-finding aspect of the harm/benefit
test-and in the process isolated an important factor for compensability-it is the
very absence of this fairness-finding factor in the harm/benefit test as it has been
used that is its greatest weakness.
Although the harm and benefit of the harm/benefit test have yet to be
defined in a manner that allows the inference that the test isolates situations of
thievery there is another reason for its strong intuitive appeal. Professor Alison
Dunham suggested that a regulation that confers a benefit on the public is one
that affirmatively enjoins a particular use of property, effectively eliminating all
alternative uses.'0 4 The liberty to enjoy one's property diminishes as does its
101. The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding inLucasv. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991) is of this variety. See Justice Scalia's dismantling of the harm/benefit test
upon review of Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-99.
102. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1236 (1967).
103. This is Justice Sutherland's metaphor froim Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926).
104. Alison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 73-8 1.
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market value. Such a regulation effectively does what a physical takeover of
property does, at least insofar as the owner is concerned. For example, a
regulation requiring the owner of an undeveloped wooded hillside to use the land
only as a wooded hillside effectively eliminates all other uses. On the other hand,
a regulation that is said to prevent or arrest a harm is one which negatively
enjoins a particular use, leaving the property owner the liberty of all other uses.
Thus, a regulation banning strip-mining negatively enjoins only one use, leaving
many potential uses still available to the owner. The stripping ban, because it
aims at one particular use, is felt to be focusing on whatever harm to the public
is caused by stripping. The woodland retention requirement is felt to give the
public the benefit of a visual prospect and a wildlife preserve. The distinction
parallels the loss of value theory except that, instead of the loss of the economic
value of the use, Dunham's harm/benefit test focuses on the loss of the liberty to
use regardless of economic value. Perhaps the distinction between degrees of lost
liberty to use one's property is important to the owner's sense of the justice of the
regulation. 1"5 But the harm/benefit test as used very imperfectly focuses on that
sense of justice or injustice. Moreover, even if "loss of liberty" is an important
consideration to the sense of justice, it is only one of several, and it "feels" less
important than profitability or lost expectations-neither of which is considered.
Yet another reason for the "strong intuitive appeal" of the harm/benefit
test is suggested by the analysis of Professor Joseph Sax.16 A regulation said to
be preventing or abating a "harm" usually prevents a use of property that
interferes with other people's use of their property. The nuisance case is the
paradigm. On the other hand, a regulation that confers a benefit on the public is
one that forces a use in order to give the public something it did not have before,
rather than preventing an interfering use. The former prevents or stops loss of
value to surrounding property; the latter adds value to surrounding property and
the public. The former occurs in situations where there is a conflict in the uses
of the land and the latter where there is no conflict.
10 7
A pristine example of a benefit conferring regulation is almost impossible
to conceive of, let alone find in fact.0 8 Perhaps a regulation requiring the use of
105. Id. at 80-81.
106. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
107. Id. at 37.
108. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976). The rezoning of
building-worthy private land, presently being used as a private park, as land to be used exclusively
as a public park is one example. By zoning regulation, the city gives the public a park it did not
have before. Ironically, no "taking" was found (an interference with exclusive possession and thus
a physical invasion could also have been found), but the court used substantive due process
reasonableness to say it was a "deprivation of property without due process of law." Id. at 388.
"Absent factors of governmental displacement of private ownership, occupation or management,
there was no 'taking' . ... There was, therefore, no right of compensation as for a taking in
eminent domain." Id. at 386 (citations omitted). This suggests that where substantive due process
is a meaningful check on unjust regulation, "takings" are limited to the pristine case of government
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property only as a playground for children would serve as an example. But
unless the word "regulation" is to lose all its meaning, it must be a "private"
playground, i.e., one over which the owner retains the power to exclude. But
there is very little public benefit in that. On the other hand, if it must be a public
playground, then there is a palpable physical invasion; such invasions certainly
need no harm/benefit analysis to determine compensability.0 9 Purely regulatory
laws which confer a pure benefit do not exist. The wooded hill example
discussed above does not give the public something it did not have before.
Rather, it allows the public or neighboring owners to retain what they currently
possess-an open vista and wildlife preserve. The use of such hill to farm would
threaten the present enjoyment of neighboring land owners and the public in
seeing natural country-side, not to mention that even a seemingly innocuous use
of land such as farming can cause physical spillover from fertilizers, pesticides
or altered drainage patterns.
takeovers. The use of substantive due process requires no damages for "inverse condemnation."
Id. at 388-89.
109. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. The rare case where public access to private property is mandated is
almost always struck down. See e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Lorretto,
458 U.S. 419; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. Tigard, 114
S. Ct. 2309 (1994). The lone exception can be distinguished by the public nature of the private
property. In PrunyardShopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the state-mandated access (by
state supreme court interpretation of the state constitution) to a privately-owned shopping center that
invites the public onto its premises was upheld because the property owner's interest in selecting
who would enter its premises or stay there is almost totally compromised by the dedicated use (or
one might say, the distinct investment-backed expectation) of the property as a public place for
shopping.
Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, involved a palpable physical invasion authorized by state law (a
public beach-access easement across private land) requiring conveyance of a recordable easement.
In other words, the state knew it was "taking" property. The state attempted to "pay" for this forced
conveyance by granting a building permit it otherwise could reasonably have withheld. This case
raises interesting "just compensation" issues: Can compensation in some form other than money
ever be "just'? If so, how can the court determine ajust and equivalent exchange? Neither of these
issues is addressed by Justice Scalia's opinion. Rather than answer the real question in the case,
Justice Scalia made a non-deferential substantive due process (sub-silentia) reasonableness analysis
of the requirement of conveyance and concluded that the reason a building permit could be withheld
must be directly related to the reason the conveyance is required. He then held that visual access
to the ocean from the road (the reason a building permit could be denied) was unrelated to the
required transfer ("utterly fails to further the end") of a property right (physical access to the ocean).
Where his "nexus" requirement comes from he does not say. Is it part of the "just compensation"
doctrine or is it substantive due process? Frankly, it sounds like substantive due process. But by
treating this case like a "regulatory taking" case, the deference barrier is lowered, for surely if the
usual substantive due process deference had been given, "access to the ocean" would be a sufficient
nexus between the granting of a building permit and the conveyance requirement Perhaps
deference should be lowered (scrutiny raised) in this kind of substantive due process analysis, but
that "lowering" should be explained and justified-not mystified by hiding behind another doctrine.
The Court could have faced the just compensation issue and explained why compensation must
always be in money. See also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, discussed infra part IV.
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The cases of Hadacheck" and Mahon111 yield examples of regulations
which gave the public something it did not have before, but they are cases
requiring resolution of conflicting uses of land; the use of harm/benefit analysis
was a hindrance to their sound resolution, not an aid. The harm/benefit theory
is, as Justice Scalia demonstrated in Lucas, a feckless way of arguing a takings
claim, but it might well be a part of substantive due process.
D. The Rhetoric of Lost Value: The Diminution of Value Test
While the physical invasion test may be too conceptual to identify injury
to the regulated owner, the realism imparted by looking at the degree of loss
yields no usable standard. No one has fixed or seems able to fix a point on the
continuum of harm beyond which compensation is required. The diminution of
value test is really no "test;" rather it is the manifestation of a strong feeling that
the degree of harm ought to be considered in order to be "fair" about
compensability.
Besides the obvious difficulty of picking a point on the scale of loss as
a tipping point, there is the equally difficult task of determining what "the loss"
actually is. Presumably it is a relative loss, i.e., a fraction of the absolute loss
(say, $5,000) divided by the value before loss (say, $10,000, 1/2 or 50%). But
what value before the loss? The rest of the owner's assets? That would be the
best measure of how much it actually hurts each owner-loser, yet under such a
formula the poor get paid; the rich do not. Maybe such a formula could be used
as a deliberate legislative policy for redistribution of wealth, equal protection
notwithstanding; as a rule of constitutional law it is unthinkable. Is "what is left"
the rest of the owner's land holdings? That is more groundless than the first
suggestion. Perhaps the rest of the particular land holding, or the rest of the
loser's interest in the land, is the proper measure? The latter formula would
involve, for example, an owner of mineral rights only in a parcel of land, where
regulations of land use make it economically impossible to extract the mineral,
reducing the value of this functional interest (essentially, the right to extract) to
zero; because this functional interest was owned separately, the relative loss
would be 1/1 or 100%. This has been suggested to be the correct
formula-Mahon stands for such a proposition.'1 2  But this formula, in
ascertaining the extent of loss, would violate one of the fundamental tenets of the
constitutional takings rule set out above-the takings rule may not get different
results depending on the functional division of ownership." 3 Moreover, neither
110. 239 U.S. 394.
111. 260 U.S. 393.
112. Id.
113. See Sax, supra note 106, at 68.
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Mahon nor any other case yields such a formula for discovering loss and thus
compensability."4
This leaves a formula based on the loss of value divided by the total
value of the affected land. Thus, if the banning of surface mining makes mineral
rights nearly valueless then a comparison of the total value of any particular
"piece" or parcel of land before such ban (say, $15,000) and after (say, $2,000)
yields the fraction, 13/15 or 87%; that is the loss, the diminution in value. But
if this fraction is used to determine compensability, then the ban will be a taking
as to some mineral rights, but not as to others, depending on other available
profitable uses for the surface. A ban on stripping would require compensation
where the surface is "useless" rocky, mountainous wilderness but would not
where the surface has immediate value as a subdivision site. This is true in spite
of the fact that the law would allow either land owner equal liberty to otherwise
(than the stripping ban) use his property. Moreover, this test would create
substantial settlement or transaction costs. Each property would have to be
examined as to value with mineral rights extractable by stripping and compared
to present value without such right. A difficult and uncertain task not only as to
appraisal, but as to finding all the affected mineral rights.
Moreover, the calculus described above is not for the purpose of
determining the amount of compensation, but compensability vel non. If property
"A" is reduced in value from, say $100,000 to $15,000, and assuming that
because the diminution in value line must be drawn somewhere, it is drawn at
85%, then the owner of property "A" is compensated - presumably the full
$85,000. If property "B" is reduced in value from $100,000 to $25,000, then (the
line being 85%) the owner is not compensated. Owner "A" gets $85,000; Owner
"B" must suffer his $75,000 loss. If you protest that the line was arbitrarily
placed, then the short answer is that it must be placed somewhere. At somepoint
those above get full compensation for their loss, those below no compensation.
Is it possible to pick a point on the continuum that is not arbitrary? Are not
arbitrary lines grossly unfair except under special circumstances where they are
an absolute necessity and they affect every one equally over time, such as with
the age requirement for voting?
The diminution of value test generates an unfair rule in another way,
distinct from the arbitrariness of the point picked. It is the arbitrariness of
picking a point at all. Why should a loser of 90% of the value of a piece of
property get paid his $5,000 loss but a "25% loser" not get paid his $5,000?
Where there is a palpable physical invasion (of as much as one square inch of a
owner's one hundred acres-an infinitesimal fraction), the state must pay. There
is a difference between palpable physical invasion and prohibition of a former
legal use, but the quantity of harm tests accounts for it only in an imprecise and
unsatisfying way.
114. Id. at 60.
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The bill of particulars of the indictment of the diminution of value or
quantity of the harm theory goes beyond the fact that it yields neither a
manageable nor a "fair" rule. Professor Sax has shown that it: (1) presupposes
a false definition of property," 5 (2) is inconsistent with the early history of the
compensation principle," 6 and (3) is not supported by the contemporaneous
history of the amendment." 7 In addition, he adds "the test imports an unworkable
problem of definition.""'
In the face of these rather overwhelming weaknesses, why is it that the
test persists as the most "populare"l 9 or dominant rhetoric of compensability, at
least in state courts? Two reasons are suggested. First, by focusing on the size
of the loss rather than the method of the infliction, the rhetoric seems to focus on
that attribute which makes regulatory losses most painful. After all, we treat
petty larceny as a different order of crime from grand larceny-one a
misdemeanor the other a felony-and the line drawn between them is purely
arbitrary. But, of course, Holmes knew that the government ought not to steal
at all-petty or grand-but he further believed that regulation in the public
interest was necessary, and regulation of the use of land was in the public interest,
ergo public necessity required a little public theft. 2° But only "property" can be
stolen. If Holmes had not believed that every potential use of land was
"property," the limiting or banning of potential uses would not be seen as theft
at all.' That would eliminate most of the "petty larceny of the police power."'2
The regulation of existing uses would be subject to takings scrutiny because
perhaps some, or even most, existing uses of land are "property" in the land.'23
But in that event, even if the theft is petty, it ought not to be condoned; such
regulation would clearly be the taking of property without just compensation.
The diminution of value theory conflates the value of land, the use of land and
the property in land. A faulty concept of property is the basic flaw of the
diminution of value theory.
A second, somewhat ironic reason for the ascendence of loss of value
theory in compensability law is that its weakness in generating a useful rule
allows courts to reach the result it intuitively feels is fair without any articulated
115. Id. at 51-53.
116. Id. at 54-57.
117. Id. at 58-60.
118. Id. at 60.
119. Id. at 50. Although Sax stated this in 1964, there is little reason to believe that this popularity
has abated. The popularity is primarily academic because the value theory is rarely decisive in its
result (as with the U.S. Supreme Court). However, a series of wetlands cases (mostly out of New
England) is an exception where diminution of value did play a crucial role. See e.g., Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 770-71 (Wis. 1972).
120. See supra notes 2-7.
121. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; but see id. at 415-16.
122. See supra note 1.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
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analysis. A rule so imprecise as to be no rule at all frees a court from having to
demonstrate how the rule applies to the facts of the case at hand. In an area of
the law that appears to defy analysis, it is comforting to have a theory that
obviates the painful necessity to analyze-i.e., to have to think about the problem.
Finally, Professor Michelman suggested that the diminution of value rule
is really a test of kind, not degree, and as such it has a useful place in
compensability doctrine. If one posits that a regulation that restricts the use of
land so as to deprive the owner of all practical use is a taking, then one needs a
practical definition of "all." ' 4 Such a definition is bound to be somewhat less
than an absolute 100% deprivation of use, otherwise the posited "taking rule"
would apply only where the state would be so foolish as to disallow the owner
from even walking about his land. But if "all" is less that 100%, as it surely was
in Lucas.. in spite of the state court finding,'26 then an arbitrary line is being
drawn. In the "foolish state" case of no use remaining whatsoever, there is a
physical ousting subject to the physical invasion rule.127
III. USING THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS REASONABLENESS TEST TO
REVIEW THE REGULATION OF PROSPECTIVE USES OF LAND
Part III addresses three issues by: (a) making a formalist defense of
substantive due process against a recent formalist attack by Justice Scalia, (b)
arguing that a reasonableness test is different from a rational basis test-that
"reasonableness" has some bite but is still deferential to the "legislative"
judgment, and that American courts use this test, and (c) defending the
proposition that a reasonableness test ought to be the only test used to review the
prospective uses of land and is so used for the most part.
I take up the first point summarily because few can doubt that substantive
due process is a viable constitutional doctrine.'28 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia
called the very phrase "substantive due process" an oxymoron.' 9 This formalist
124. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
125. 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.2. The owner could still put wooden walkways and small wooden decks
on his lot.
126. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992).
127. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
128. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (1993).
129. In United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2026 (1994), Scalia began his concurrence: "If
I thought 'substantive due process' were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would
think it violated by bait-and-switch taxation." Later he added, "I welcome this recognition that the
Due Process Clause does not prevent retroactive taxes, since I believe that the Due Process Clause
guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as it says) process." Id. at 2027.
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attack13 on the doctrine deserves a formalist defense, especially as I have
defended the idea here that formalism (of a sort) is necessary to legitimacy. So
we start with the constitutional language: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." '31 Surely the word
"liberty" can encompass the right to use one's land. It may not be a preferred
liberty, such as speech or familial privacy, but it is a "liberty" nonetheless. If one
is "deprived" of a use of one's property by state regulation surely the first part
of the text is "literally" satisfied. Now comes the harder part. For Scalia, a
regulation duly enacted according to constitutional forms and enforced by judicial
due process is quite literally "due process" of law so that the deprivation is not
"without" due process of law. But, there are two distinct ways we can quite
logically review the substance of the regulation through this text. Both ways
focus on the word "law".
In order for a set of words to gain the status of law, they must be duly
enacted which requires not only that the proper form be followed (moved, voted
on, etc.), but that the enacting legislative body be exercising a power appropriate
to it. In the nineteenth century, the rhetoric of proper legislative powers was
freely engaged in."' A purported regulation of land use would be a "police
power" exercise. Because the concept of "police power" has limits, a court might
inquire as to whether a particular regulation of land use was really an exercise of
police power.' The court would, of course, do this by spinning out the concept
of police power into a limited set of purposes (health, safety, morals and welfare)
and then examining the regulation to see if in fact it served one of those
purposes. 34 Of course, that is exactly what the Court did in Lochner v. New
York.' 5
The second way of getting at substance through the words "due process
of law" is again to focus on the word "law." The due process clause traces its
origin to the Magna Carta and the latin phrase "per legem terre" or the "law of
the land." This immediately suggests reasoned judgment versus arbitrary fiat or
will. "Law" is contrasted with arbitrary fiat. A rule laid down by a legislative
130. Some highly respected scholars simply assume that the text of the Due Process Clause (and
"original intent") do not support a substantive component to the Due Process Clause. See JOHN H.
ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST 15 (1980); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 (1981).
131. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
132. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
133. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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body is not law unless it is reasonable,1 16 or so the argument goes-and has gone
since at least Dr. Bonham's Case."3 7 A legal positivist may disagree with this
concept of law, but it is a concept long held by American jurists. 3 '
Of course, I am only making a formal defense of the claim that the due
process clause has a substantive component. Clearly the text can support such a
reading. The sin of Lochner"3 9 is not its being atextual. Rather the sin lay in
Justice Peckham's obliviousness to the subjective and political nature of his
judgment and the resultant total lack of deference to the New York legislative
judgment.
I shall now examine briefly two deferential substantive due process tests,
describe their differences and argue why one, the reasonable test, has been and
ought to be used by the judiciary to review land use regulation.
A. The Difference Between a Reasonableness Test and a Rational Basis Test
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp.,4' the Supreme
Court clearly rejected a substantive due process "rational basis" test in favor of
136. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819) (argument of Daniel
Webster):
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law, which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities, under the protection ofthe general rules which govern
society. Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, is not,
therefore, to be considered the law of the land.
See ELY, supra note 130, at 190.
Certain historical antecedents of the phrase suggest an additional and somewhat distinct
meaning. To the extent that its roots are in the French term process de ley, the phrase would seem
to convey the requirement that serious injury be inflicted only in accord with (a process of) law,
as opposed, presumably, to a process of anarchy or unbridled discretion. Cf E. Coke, 2 THE
INsTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46, 50 (1671). See Dunham, Magna Carta and British
Constitutionalism, in THE GREAT CHARTER 26 (1965).
137. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610). Sir Edward Coke stated, "for when an act of parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
control it, and adjudge such act to be void." Id.
138. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884):
Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power .... [It]
exclud[es], as not due process of law, acts of attainder [etc.] ... and other
similar special, partial and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of
legislation. Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons
and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifest as the decree of a
personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude.
See Lawrence Tribe, Substantial Due Process of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONsTrrunoN 1796-1803, at 4 (1986).
139. See supra note 133.
140. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
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a "reasonableness" test. 41 The plurality then made a complete muddle of what
reasonableness meant in the context of a claim of excessiveness in awarding
punitive damages in a state civil law suit. Nonetheless from TXO's various
opinions and from other cases, it is clear that there is a reasonableness test distinct
from a rational basis test and that use of the varying tests can achieve varying
results. The rational basis test is satisfied (and the legislation or other
governmental action saved) if the government action can be shown to have some
plausible factual relationship to some arguably legitimate public interest that it is
plausible to believe the legislative enactor sought to promote, without having any
regard for how onerous the burden might be on the regulated party.'42 The
reasonableness test, on the other hand, takes into account the extent of the burden
on the regulated party and requires that the public interest promoted be
proportionate to that burden.'43 In other words, the greater the burden, the greater
must be the justifying public interest. It is a rough cost/benefit or balancing test.
The judgments that need to be made to apply such a test are, of course,
contestable and difficult-sometimes said to be "subjective," which is only to say
that a human being must make the judgments, which are a combination of "facts"
and "values"--legislative and adjudicative facts, public and private values.
So there is an obvious difference between a unilateral rationality test and
a bilateral rationality test. If proper deference is paid to the initial legislative
judgment, then the government must be brain dead to lose under the unilateral
test. But even if proper deference is paid, the bilateral test will catch an
occasional case of regulatory carelessness; the Court can conclude that the public
gain is not worth the private candle.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is not usually clear about which test it
is using. For example, in Nectow v. Cambridge' Justice Sutherland, speaking
for a unanimous court (that included Justices Brandeis, Stone and Holmes), made
the following statements in the course of a three page opinion striking down a
zoning restriction on Nectow's property:
(A) "The attack upon the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff
in error, it deprived him of his property without due process of law in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 45
(B) "It is made pretty clear that because of the industrial and railroad
purposes to which the immediately adjoining lands to the south and east
have been devoted and for which they are zoned, the locus [Nectow's
property] is of comparatively little value for the limited uses permitted by
the ordinance."'46
141. Id. at 2719-20.
142. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948).
143. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721.
144. 277 U.S. 183.
145. Id. at 185.
146. Id. at 187.
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(C) "We quite agree with the opinion expressed below that a court should not
set aside the determination of public officers in such a matter unless it is
clear that their action 'has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary
or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public
health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its
proper sense."'147
(D) "[T]he inclusion of the locus in question is not indispensable to the
general plan [which the Court upheld]."'48
(E) "Nevertheless, if that were all, we should not be warranted in substituting
our judgment for that of the zoning authorities primarily charge with the
duty... of determining the question."' 49
(F) "The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the
general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is
not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."'"0
(G) "Here, the express finding of the master, already quoted, confirmed by
the court below is that the health, safety, convenience and general welfare
of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be promoted by
the disposition made by the ordinance of the locus in question. This
finding of the master, after a hearing and an inspection of the entire area
affected, supported, as we think it is, by other findings of fact, is
determinative of the case.''
(H1) "That the invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and
highly injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary basis for the
support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be
sustained."'5 2
A quick analysis of the quoted statements shows the Court's ambiguity.
(A) announces that the Court is using due process, not takings, doctrine.'53 In (B)
the Court notes that the regulated private land has lost considerable value. In (C)
147. Id. at 187-88 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
148. Id. at 188.
149. Id. (citing Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Even this is not entirely free from ambiguity because review of the substance of state action
must go through the Fourteenth Amendment, which has a Due Process Clause but no Takings
Clause. The latter clause has been incorporated into the former, but technically every takings case
(applied to state government action) is a due process case. Chicago & Burlington, 166 U.S. at 239.
But since the word "taking" is no where else mentioned by Justice Sutherland, it is fair to assume
that he felt he was using the due process doctrine, rather than the takings doctrine, in deciding the
case. Id.
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the Court stresses the deference it must pay the legislative judgment to the point
of sounding as if ("has no foundation in reason," a mere arbitrary or irrational
exercise of power) it must use a rational basis test, but then the Court qualifies
the absoluteness of its language with "no substantial relation," making it again
sound like a question of degree. Then (D) sounds a further note of degree "not
indispensable" to the public purpose. (E) is a further caution about deference,
and (F) uses another phrase suggesting degree: "substantial relation." But (G)
sounds the absolute tone of rational basis-public purposes "will not be
promoted" and that this is "determinative of the case". Then (H) sounds again
the note of balancing and comparative harm and benefit: "serious and highly
injurious" to one side and the lack of "a necessary basis for the support of that
invasion" by the other side.
Taken together, a kind of rough balancing is evident in Justice
Sutherland's opinion, but in two distinct sets of phrases, (C) and (G), he takes a
rational basis tone. This ambiguity is probably the usual judicial discomfort with
balancing tests-such tests seem unjudicial and too political (the lack of certain
quantification makes palpable the subjectiveness of the judgment). At least in
Nectow, the Court unambiguously relies on due process and not on takings
doctrine.'54 In more recent cases, the Court is unclear whether it uses due process
or takings but is fairly clear, as in Penn Central,' that it is using a balancing test
which, of course, is only appropriate to the due process clause.
B. Judicial Use of a Reasonableness Test in a Land Use Case
Nectow is a prime example of the avowed use of the substance component
of the due process clause with a deferential reasonableness test (although
ambiguously expressed). 56  Why have state and federal courts used this
reasonableness test and why should they? I believe the reasons are obvious: (1)
our legal tradition of protecting private property values insofar as is practical
(from non-market losses especially) and our legal tradition's abiding faith in the
judicial process 57 combine to give us a collective commitment expressed in the
clich6 "government of law not men" where "law" means order, stability, and
predictability guaranteed by our traditional adversarial judicial process; and (2)
protecting private property values through the Takings Clause is, for all the
reasons stated in this article, inappropriate, whereas protecting property value
through the Due Process Clause fits its language, its history and good sense.
Moreover, use of the Takings Clause creates the enormous problem of inverse
condemnation which has a potentially crippling, "chilling effect" on regulatory
154. 277 U.S. 183.
155. 438 U.S. 104.
156. 277 U.S. 183.
157. See, HoRwrrz, supra note 4, at 213-46 (detailing the unsuccessful battle to free the regulating
bureaucracy from the control of courts of law).
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action.'58 As the recent case Dolan v. Tigard"59 demonstrates, if balancing is done
within takings doctrine it is non-deferential.
So why have courts, especially the United States Supreme Court; been so
reluctant to use unambiguously the substantive component of due process to
review the regulation of potential uses of property? Here the reasons are
complex. As is well-known, "substantive due process" got such a bad odor about
it that by the end of the 1930s the United States Supreme Court all but disclaimed
its use. 6 When the Court did want to review the substance of state regulatory
action it resorted to subterfuge that allowed it to deny it was doing "substantive
due process" analysis even while using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to review the substance of state action. This inventive subterfuge
became the incorporation doctrine which has its own rich history. 6' When the
incorporation doctrine would not fit an obnoxious and aberrational Connecticut
regulation of sexual conduct, the ever inventive Justice Douglas extended
"incorporation" from express rights to "implied express" rights, stating that a
fundamental right of privacy was immanent in, or implied by, rights expressed in
the Bill of Rights. 62 But academic lawyers began to see through the subterfuge,
especially after the far more controversial use of the subterfuge in Roe v. Wade.'63
By 1977, in Moore v. East Cleveland, 4 Justice Powell was able to use the words
"substantive due process" in an opinion striking down a property use regulation. 165
Moreover, the Court never actually killed "substantive due process." It
simply reduced it to a formula that was essentially no review-the rational basis
test. Therefore, when substantive due process reappeared under its own name, it
was thought to have two branches, "heightened scrutiny" and "rational basis,"
which meant in practice state loses and state wins, respectively. Heightened
158. First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
159. 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
160. Indeed, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter all but declared that Lochner was overruled
in their joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2812 (1992): "West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish [300 U.S. 379 (1937)] signalled the demise
of Lochner." West Coast Hotel expressly overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923), which was a Lochner-style case, yet Lochner has never been expressly overruled. See
Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitutional of Change: Legal Fundamentality without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 73-82 (1993). But, of course, the Justices in Casey are
right: the spirit of Lochneris dead-non-deferential economic substantive due process died with the
Great Depression. But in the guise of takings doctrine newly revised in Lucas, and newly disguised
in Dolan, non-deferential economic regulatory review walks again. See infra text accompanying
notes 211-36.
161. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968) (reviewing the history of the
incorporation doctrine).
162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
163. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
164. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
165. Id. at 502-03.
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scrutiny itself was divided into two branches with the gender cases."' I suggest
that "lower scrutiny" also has two branches, and always has: rational basis and
reasonableness.
Only recently has the Court actually acknowledged two tests within lower
or deferential scrutiny. But in the following kinds of cases it has used a
deferential balancing test for some time: punitive damage awards review,'67
retroactive legislative impact review16 and certain equal protection cases where
the complainant has a sufficient interest to merit heightened concern but not
enough to qualify under either prong of the heightened scrutiny doctrine.'69 In
each of these three types of cases, the interest asserted by the individual to be lost
is different from and greater than mere economic value. In the punitive damages
and retroactive impact cases, the interest is economic loss coupled with unfair
surprise; in "certain equal protection cases" it was noneconomic interests that
were lost.
Is loss of land use potentially more than mere economic loss? Land use
cases are analogous to retroactive impact cases and are indeed a species of
retroactive impact cases. When one owns land one expects to be able to use it
in any way that will not be a nuisance and that is not positively proscribed.
When a new proscription is legislated, one loses not only the economic value such
potential use added to the land but also the reliance on that use and value, not a
fixed and settled expectation amounting to "property" but a reasonable expectation
nonetheless.
This suggests that the same kind of balancing test, long been used in
retroactive impact cases, is appropriate here, that is, the consideration is not mere
private economic value lost versus public interest gained. Rather, the test is the
economic value lost times the reasonableness of the expectation of having that
value versus the gain to the public. Thus, in a case where the potential use at the
time just prior to the proscriptive enactment not only added great market value
to the land and was not positively proscribed but was in fact positively allowed,
166. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
167. TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2711; see also Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
168. Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., the Court first acknowledged "that retroactive legislation does have to meet a
burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects" but went on to reject the articulated
reasonableness test of Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947 (1979),
which was based on Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 467
U.S. 717, 727-34 (1984). The Court then purports to use a "rational legislative purpose test" but
shows the bilateral (rough balancing) nature of its review by stating the enactment of retroactive
statutes "confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national
legislation" is acceptable. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114
S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
169. I have in mind Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a gender
classification for the first time).
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one's expectations for the continuing legality of the use are considerably
enhanced. Thus, if one buys vacant land to use as a business site which when
bought was "zoned" by positive law for business use, one's expectations of the
land retaining its business-use value are considerably greater than if there were
no land use regulations in place at the time of purchase. This does not mean, of
course, that a city may not change any zoned area from less restrictive to more
restrictive, but only that if it does rezone down, that change (and its relative
unexpectedness) will be part of the calculus of reasonableness when reviewed by
a court.
Let me also make clear that existing zoning laws do not create a property
interest in those potential uses of the zoned land that are consistent with the
zoning law. The owner of a lot used for residential purposes in a business zone
does not have a "property" interest in that business use, although she does have
a property interest in the continuance of the existing residential use (assuming it's
legal in the business zone). Nonetheless, such existing laws create expectations,
the nature and extent of which will be a factor in the calculus of reasonableness
under due process of law. To put it in the language I use in the next section,
existing land use regulations do not create a fixed and settled expectation in every
potential use thereby allowed. Existing regulations do create a greater expectation
than no regulation at all, therefore they figure in the calculation of reasonableness.
The reasonableness test has both flexibility and bite. But because, as
Justice Sutherland emphasized, it is deferential, it is no crippling predator as
Pinckney-style Lochner was or heightened scrutiny is. It ought to keep and has
(at the state court level) kept land use regulators honest and careful without
overcaution born of fearfulness. Using a diminution of value takings test to reach
the regulation of potential uses is either so flexible as to be totally arbitrary or so
inflexible, as with the all/some line of Lucas, as to be useless, for no fact finder
will find that no value is left after regulation. Thus, it can keep regulators neither
honest nor careful (one has to have some standard of care before one can be
careful). At the same time, the reverse condemnation feature of takings doctrine
makes broad use of the Takings Clause as a source of regulatory overcaution.
The result is not careful regulation, but rather fearful regulation. Moreover, the
reasonable test has sufficient bite to breed carefulness unlike the rational basis test
which is utterly toothless.
IV. MAJORITARIAN THEFT: WHAT A TAKINGS CLAUSE Is FOR
Because judicial review of land use regulation by a deferential substantive
due process reasonableness test is in place at the state and federal levels awaiting
only the Supreme Court's official acknowledgement and blessing, what is left or
ought to be left of the Takings Clause? In other words, what is a Takings Clause
for? "Not much" in terms of doctrine actually used to review regulations. The
Takings Clause is a promise almost always kept. The occasional transgression of
the Takings Clause is easily identified and rectified. The Takings Clause is,
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nonetheless, important as a symbol of our national commitment to Lockean
individualism and the concomitant commitment to the privileges of private
property. It is a foundational doctrine. The rhetoric that elaborates it must make
manifest its function by defining property as a foundational concept in its
foundational role. The state may not take one's property unless it pays for the
property. The state must treat private property as if the state were a private
person, except the state can force the sale. The foundational idea of property as
a legal concept is that the state will defend it against theft-against other people
taking it without paying for it. Although there are plenty of public laws against
theft, the most aggressive and egregious form of taking, one also should note the
numerous private law remedies against taking property where the act of taking is
less aggressive and often is accomplished under a claim of right.
In each case, whether under public or private law, the claim is that the
defendant got something without paying for it against the owner's desires.
Property is about rights in things that can be bought and sold and given away and
borrowed and lent and stolen! In short, property is about the exclusive possession
of "things" and the transferring of that possession at the sole discretion of the
owner except where there is a public interest of substantial magnitude that allows
the state to regulate transfers. Therefore, the right to transfer is not itself
"property," but a part of the definition of property. "Property" is something
capable of transfer. (Moreover value is not property, although transfers are often
for value.) And, of course, the "something" in which a "person" has property,
which usually has exchange value and usually can be exchanged, also can be
used. Such use is subject to anticipatory regulation and is not itself "property"
except where one possesses one's possession with a use.
All of this seems very primitive and unsophisticated. Of course, the legal
idea of "property" described above is primitive and unsophisticated-it's a
foundational idea, and it's still part of the foundation. The rhetoric that grows
from this primitive (but up-to-date) notion of property and its taking will appear
more sophisticated if it can be described by the function it serves in terms of
human welfare: property creates fixed and settled expectations in its holder, and
taking is the upsetting of those fixed and settled expectations. The honoring of
expectations is an essential ingredient in the pie of human happiness and
flourishing.
A. Majoritarian Theft, the Concept
"Majoritarian theft" is any deliberate act by the majority either through
government or persistent public behavior which has as a purpose the gain of
something by the public or some identifiable segment of it and which is
necessarily attended with the loss of a fixed and settled expectation to identifiable
members of the public where such loss is not paid for at the price that the private
market would dictate. The further definitions which are crucial to this concept
are gain, something, and fixed and settled expectations.
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"Gain" is like "benefit" as it is often used in the harm/benefit test but
without any moral connotation. The word "gain" focuses on time-the public's
having something after the act which they did not have before it. It is used here
in distinct contrast to "retain" and "regain."
The "something" that is "gained" is anything that could make for
individual happiness, satisfaction, comfort, etc. For want of a better generic-one
that is descriptive and not value laden-I shall use the word "want." The
"something" then is anything some people will, at least figuratively, want. The
list of wants includes the possession and use of space, and of things in space, and
many intangibles like quiet, cleaner air, cleaner water, clearer sky, a visual
prospect, lower risk of injury, lower risk of disease, and subjacent support of
land. This list is endless.
The "fixed and settled" expectations that must be upset before the theft
is complete are those expectations that are fixed as to time and settled by means
that give notice to the world that, as between "these parties," certain expectations
exist. Often the expectations are created as between one person or a small group
and the rest of the world. A deed to land in fee simple to "A" gives "A" the
right to exclude, the privilege to possess, etc., as against the whole world.17 If
"A" gives "B" a deed to the minerals in his land and the privilege of stripping the
land to get them, this creates fixed and settled rights as between "A" and "B" to
strip, but as against the world unless "A" had a fixed and settled right to strip his
land as against the world.17'
But mere ownership, which certainly implies a right to possess and enjoy,
does not imply a right to use in any manner the owner wants.'72 Surely a basic
tenet of "property law" is that one has a right to use one's property in any way
that does not "hurt" others.' Whether a particular use "hurts" others is
determined by land use regulations or by the common law of nuisance.'74
Obviously either of these sets of rules and standards can change or else there
could be no law limiting uses, for at one time no particular use would have hurt
others as there were no others. If the law as to "uses" of land can change, then
does any "use" ever become a "fixed and settled" expectation? The line must be
between uses-in-being and uses-not-in-being (a slightly larger group than uses-in-
contemplation). If, when a use comes into being, as when one turns the spade in
a bona fide beginning of an apartment building, and it is not unlawful to so use
one's land, then such use becomes "fixed" as to time and scope and "settled" in
that it gives general notice to the community that it is the way the property will
be used. As discussed above, a use-in-being made unlawful does not necessarily
170. JOHN E. CRIBBEr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 40 (2d ed. 1975).
171. Id. at 343-45.
172. Id. at 40.
173. Id. at 397.
174. Id. at 362, 397.
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mean majoritarian theft.'75 On the other hand, uses-in-being do not exhaust the
entire class of "fixed and settled expectations" as to the use of land as a second
examination of Mahon will shortly disclose.
Let us look at several paradigm cases in light of the simple concept of
majoritarian theft: the regulating State upsets the fixed and settled expectations
of private parties, expectations revered by long tradition and deep conviction as
"property," in order to gain something it never had.
B. Application to Some Paradigm Cases
1. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 176 an Existing Use Case
Hadacheck owned eight acres of clay rich land outside of the city limits
of Los Angeles and "distant from dwellings and other habitations and [such] that
he did not expect or believe ...that the territory would be annexed to the
city.'"177 He had "erected expensive machinery for the manufacture of bricks of
fine quality" and the property was worth $800,000 as a brickyard, $60,000 as a
residential site. 178 The city grew up around the brickyard, and after seven years
of existence the city passed an ordinance outlawing the brickyard.
179
Did Hadacheck have a fixed and settled expectation as to the continued
use of his property? It was "fixed" as to time and location and nature, but it was
not settled as between Hadacheck and the rest of the world. No deed or other
permit existed granting such right. The fact of use was such that Hadacheck
might well have known that other people would not like it if they moved nearby.
In effect, the Court held that Hadacheck could not hold the surrounding property.
hostage to his use:
A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of
conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are
in the way they must yield to the good of the community. The
logical result of the petitioner's contention would seem to be that
a city could not be formed or enlarged against the resistance of
an occupant of the ground and -that if it grows at all it can only
grow as the environment of the occupations that are usually
banished to the purlieus. 8
175. See discussion supra at part II.B.4.
176. 239 U.S. 394.
177. Id. at 405.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 405-06.
180. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
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The court has effectively said "the use is not a nuisance per se, but you
ought to have known it would be obnoxious to residential users that might move
nearby. Therefore, as between you and the future residents it is not 'settled' that
you have a 'vested right' to continue such use forever.'. Hadacheck had no
proper expectation in continuing use under the circumstances; therefore, no
"vested right"--and thus no "property"--was taken.
It is true that in Hadacheck, the people, through government, required a
nonuse of property so as to gain something. When people built around
Hadacheck's lot, they did not have "brickyardless" quiet; so they gained quiet,
and that is a "want." But since no fixed and settled expectation existed in the
brickyard use near a burgeoning community, no property existed to be stolen.
Nonetheless, Hadacheck is a very close case. The expectation as to use was
"fixed" and only "not settled" because it was near a burgeoning community."8 2
2. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, a Deeded Use Case
Given the fact most relied on by Holmes, that the Kohler Act was
intended to only benefit superjacent owners and not the general public,' Mahon
is a classic example of majoritarian theft. The right to pull the pillars out from
under the surface was fixed in a recorded deed (scores of such deeds) and settled
as between the parties and successors to the deeds. Those parties, and apparently
only those parties, were the intended beneficiaries of the Act, at least according
to Holmes." 4 The Act simply took the property right and transferred it by
regulation from a politically weaker to a politically stronger set of people, and
thereby was a classic case of majoritarian theft. A contemporaneous commentator
saw this as an abuse of the "popular will" stripping "a person of his property
rights without compensation."' 5
On the other hand, if the Kohler Act were designed to and would in fact
benefit the general public, then clearly there is no taking. The right to pull the
pillars was a property right as against the surface owner only. The deed did not
create, and did not purport to create, any settled right to usage as against the
181. The "might move nearby" perhaps should read "would more than likely move nearby." It
would seem that an existing use in a location not likely to become bothersome to other land users
in the foreseeable future ought to create a "settled expectation" in that use.
182. "Coming to the nuisance" arguments are seldom accepted by common law courts. See The
Silent Revolution, supra note 36, at 323-30. Thus, if one engages in an activity which is generally
annoying to other nearby land users, then, even if there are currently no "other nearby land users"
annoyed, one does not gain an expectation settled as to the world to continue in perpetuity the
"generally annoying" activity. Hadacheck, a unanimous decision, seems to stand for that
proposition-a proposition with deep roots in nuisance law as Lewin suggests.
183. But see the dissent of Justice Brandeis supra note 64.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
185. Note, Constitutional Law-Police Power, Regulation, and Confiscation, 21 MICH. L. REV.
581, 583-84 (1923), cited in Friedman, supra note 4, at 4 n.13.
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whole world. As Brandeis pointed out: "One whose rights, such as they are, are
subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by
making a contract about them."'i 6 One could hardly have a fixed and settled
expectation about a future use of land. Such future use is neither fixed nor
settled. One can have an expectation, even a reasonable expectation, about a
future use and bet a lot of money on its value. But it is not fixed as to time and
extent and settled with other people, namely the general public, until the use is
well begun or a public authority grants permission in such a way as to create
reliance."7
3. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"88 an Existing Use and
Future Use Case
Penn Central clearly had no fixed and settled expectation about future use
of the air space over Grand Central Station. Did it have a fixed and settled use
in its existing structure and attendant activity? Obviously! Then can it be forced
to maintain that fixed and settled use? The "fixed and settled use" is a fixed and
settled set of expectations about use-it is fixed, for some seventy years with a
Beaux Art structure, and settled, for the whole world sees the occupancy of the
site. Thus one has a right, a property right, to continue that structure and activity.
Any new use the owner might want to make is simply a use-in-contemplation, not
fixed nor settled and thus subject to police power regulation, which is subject to
judicial review for reasonableness. This is exactly what Justice Brennan
did-review for reasonableness. 8 9
4. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 9 ' a Pure Future Use Case
This is an easy case. South Carolina only prohibited a future use of
property, a use-in-contemplation. There is nothing fixed or settled about the use
such that a ban is the equivalent of interference with, or destruction of, the kind
of expectations we call and have called "property" for over 200 years. Only
when the state ousts one from possession has there ever been a taking held. As
shown above, this is true in every case. Being ousted from possession must mean
186. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 421 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
188. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra notes 26 and 92-97 and accompanying text.
189. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38. The "reasonableness" review ofthd Landmark Preservation
Act restrictions is prefaced with a citation from Mahon about the magnitude of lost value. That
citation has no coherence with what follows which is a fairly straight forward reasonableness
analysis. But the citation to Mahon and its "magnitude" standard greatly adds to the sense of
muddle of the opinion.
190. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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that one cannot physically occupy his land, or some part of it, or that he must
share his occupancy with someone not of his choosing.
Moreover, in this case South Carolina is not gaining something it did not
have. It is preventing a terrible harm to the ecosystem. If the state discovers that
the only developmental use for my property is inconsistent with my neighbors'
quiet enjoyment of their property, the court had always, prior to Lucas, upheld
the ban on the development. Only a thin line of dictum about having a right to
some economically valuable use of one's land stretching back to dictum in Mahon
and further back to Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, where the phrase "wholly
useless" was used by Justice Holmes, give Justice Scalia's ahistoric and atextual
reading of the Takings Clause any glimmer of integrity with our constitutional
heritage.19 1
Fine, but a majority of the court concurred in Justice Scalia's rationale in
Lucas. What happened? Well, a funny thing happened on the way to Lucas.
First, the Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed to decide the case on the
assumption, which was effectively a stipulation, that "Lucas's two beachfront lots
[had] been rendered valueless by [the South Carolina Coastal Council's]
enforcement of the coastal-zone construction ban."' 92 Ghostly precedent-throw
away lines for impossible situations, the classic dismissal of the paraded
horrible--would now have a chance for nonspectral appearance-the impossible
fact made real.
The South Carolina Supreme Court made a second mistake. They relied
on the rhetoric of governmental purpose-the harm/benefit test-to defend their
State's practice against Lucas' charge that a value wipe-out is a taking.193 As
pointed out above, the harm/benefit analysis is fine as a moral justification for
regulation, but it is terrible as a line drawing theory.' 94 As Justice Scalia pointed
out with devastating effectiveness, the line it draws would only be tripped over
by a "legislature [with] a stupid staff."' 95
The Supreme Court takes this case with truly aberrational facts and a
straw-man sent to defend it. Justice Scalia then takes the dictum of Mahon, Penn
Central,96 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,197 Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association,'98 Keystone Bituminous 99 and Agins v.
Tiburon,"' and claims that the Court has since Mahon had a diminution of value
191. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
192. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 (emphasis added), 2896 n.9.
193. Id. at 2896.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 101-118.
195. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2989 n.12.
196. 438 U.S. 104.
197. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
198. 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981).
199. 480 U.S. at 495.
200. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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test with at least an all/some line. He obviously assumes, like Holmes in Mahon,
that uses of property are "rights in property" and "rights in property" are
"property" subject to being taken and that the state can take some of this
"property" but it cannot take it all. Justice Scalia's opinion includes no rationale
for the all/some line. All he does is cite Mahon and dictum. He hints that "all"
is like ouster. "Ouster" suggests physical dispossession (he uses the word
"confiscation"), so he may be relying on the physical invasion test after all. If
that is the rationale, then Lucas will prove a curious aberration and have no effect
on the law.
However, Justice Scalia had to know that there was no physical ouster in
this case2 °1 like either Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,22
or Nollan °3 or even like Mahon. The whole tenor of his opinion assumes that
future uses are "property" subject to be taken. The all/some line will not hold
because, for the reasons stated earlier, it makes no sense.2"4 It will become a
purely grand larceny versus petty larceny line. "Grand" will be defined as what
feels like "most" to "most people." Indeed, Scalia uses the phrase "essential use"
of land. And listen to his charge to the state if it wishes to uphold its statute on
remand:
South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance
and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found. Only on
this showing can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all
such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking
nothing." 5
He does not invite the state to show that some market value remains in
the lot or that some uses, even slight developmental uses, are left. In effect he
has already abandoned the all/some line. Because it is clear in Lucas that South
Carolina could show and would show that some uses and some value remain in
the Lucas lots,2" 6 Scalia obviously thinks that it does not matter. The next step
is to say expressly "essentially all," then "substantially all." Soon we could have
201. Indeed, he knew that there was no complete loss of value, for he writes that "[t]he Act did
allow the construction of certain nonhabitable improvements." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.2
(1992). See also id. at 2904, 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
203. 483 U.S. 825.
204. Seesupratext accompanying notes 119-127. Indeed, if the all/some (or put affirmatively and
perhaps more logically the "no value/some value") line were truly adhered to, it would surely be
a legislature with "a stupid staff' that would trip over it. See supra note 196 and accompanying
text.
205. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
206. See supra note 203.
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full blown recognition that potential uses of the things of property that add
present market value to the "thing" are "property," subject to the Takings Clause,
and that the state ought never to steal. Besides, it's too hard to draw a line
between petty and grand larceny. So, except under the most exigent
circumstances or clear historic limitations on uses of property, the state may not
regulate the use of privately owned land. Professor Richard Epstein20 7 will have
arrived, and the Regulatory State will be dead. Of course, that will not happen.
I only suggest that is where Lucas logically leads. But then the life of the law
has not been "logic".
5. Dolan v. Tigard, °  an Exchange of Property for Use Case
Dolan v. Tigard is a case like Nollan2. 9 where the state requires an
exchange of property as compensation to the public for the cost to the public of
granting a developmental use of land. Justice Rehnquist, writing for four
others,2 10 seized on the fact that the "state," in fact, took what is incontestably
"property" from a private citizen in order to invoke "takings" doctrine and to treat
the case more or less as a just compensation case.21 In then deciding whether the
developmental privilege granted by the city was "just compensation" for the grant
of property, the Chief Justice used a "rough proportionality" test.2 12 Sounds good
so far-a reasonableness test to limit regulatory action. But because this
reasonableness test is part of takings doctrine213 it is not deferential. Indeed, the
state must demonstrate the reasonableness of the exchange. Doubts are therefore
207. RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
3-6 (1985).
208. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
209. 483 U.S. 825.
210. Justices Scalia and Thomas, of course, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy not quite so, of
course. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309.
211. This was presaged by Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, discussed supra note 109.
212. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
213. Technically, there is a taking of a "property" interest in land in this case so, in that sense, it
is a "takings" case. But since the state acknowledges the taking and recognizes its duty to
compensate, the case falls into that part 6f the Takings Clause doctrine dealing with assessing just
compensation. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945). See supra note
96 discussing General Motors.
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resolved against the state.214 In this case, burden of proof made all the
difference."1 5
So the question comes down to this: who has the burden of persuasion
as to reasonableness? The question of burden of persuasion (or deference) turns
on how the case is conceptualized, i.e., into what constitutional doctrine the
analysis is plugged. There are three sockets here: (1) just compensation, (2)
regulatory taking without compensation, or (3) pure regulation of economic
interests with no uncompensated taking. If the case is conceived of as one of just
compensation, then the initial decisionmaker's decision (here the planning
commission and city council) ought to be upheld as long as it was reasonable, just
as an appellate court would uphold a jury's judgment in an eminent domain case.
If the case is conceived of as regulatory taking without compensation, then the
incorporation doctrine's preferred liberties dogma21 6 puts the burden on the state
to justify its action. If the case is conceived of as the mere regulation of
214. [Justice Stevens] is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally
applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging
the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property
rights. Here, by contrast the city made an adjudicative decision to condition
petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this
situation the burden properly rests on the city. [citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836].
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8 (citation omitted).
The citation to Nollan is strange. Nowhere does Justice Scalia mention "deference" or
the burdens of justification, demonstration, or proof. He assumes in his analysis of the state's
justification that the burden is on the state. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. In his own words, however,
"we find that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards" of 'fit' between the
condition lateral beach easement and the burden to the public of loss of visual access. Id. So Scalia
says that even if we pay deference, this "condition" is unreasonable or is not justly compensated.
See supra note 109 for a discussion of what Scalia does in Nollan. Does the Chief Justice want us
to ignore what Justice Scalia actually said and follow only what he did?
215. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320-22. Aside from the blunt assertion that the "'strong presumption
of constitutional validity' does not apply here; "[w]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances,"
and then "[w]e turn now to analysis of whether the findings relied upon by the city here, first with
respect to the floodplain easement and second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path, satisfied
these requirements." Id. at 2320. By analogy to First and Fourth Amendment cases, then clearly
the "presumption" here works against the state.
Then the Court concludes "that the findings [with respect to the floodplain easement].
do not show the required reasonable relationship." Id. at 2321 (emphasis added). As to the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway, "the city has not met its burden of demonstrating." Id. at 2321
(emphasis added). Then the Court vividly illustrates what the burden of persuasion means: "[t]he
findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system 'could offset some of the traffic demand' is a far
cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic
demand." Id. at 2322 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dolan v. Tigard, 854
P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J., dissenting)). If the burden is on the state, only "would" will
do; if the burden is on the challenger "could" is good enough.
216. Id. at 2320-22.
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economic interests which happens to include a provision for payment by the
regulated of some regulatory costs, then this is a substantive due process case
requiring the deferential reasonableness test discussed in the previous section.
Thus of the three doctrinal options here, two put the burden of persuasion
on the challenger of government action and one puts it on the government. Chief
Justice Rehnquist picked the latter. He assumed that, because a possessory
interest in real estate was to be transferred to the state, this was a "regulatory
takings case," which meant to him a takings-sans-compensation case. But wait,
this is certainly not a typical regulatory takings (or eminent domain) case. The
state did not initiate the transfer. The state has the power to grant something that
the owner has no positive right to have, a developmental use of her land. Under
the existing law she has a right to ask the state for such a developmental privilege
and a further constitutional right to be treated reasonably by the state which
includes both a fair process and a reasonable decision. Now, Rehnquist says, it
may not be a typical forced sale Takings Clause case, but it's an "unconstitutional
conditions" Takings Clause case.217 The state, he says, "may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when
property is taken for public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no
relationship to the benefit. 218
But wait, the state says it will give and she will receive just compensation
for the sacrificed property. The owner is not, as she claims, "forced . . . to
choose between the building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to
just compensation for the public easements."219 Rather she must choose between
a building permit and the public easement for which the permit is just
compensation. Now if the owner should say "but the permit is not just
compensation," then the first question would be who gets to decide what just
compensation is? And, of course, that is the all important question, for whoever
"gets to decide" initially will have a presumption of correctness (that's what
getting to decide means) to be overcome by one who challenges the decision.
Therefore, in order to maintain that this case is one of an unconstitutional
condition, it must be shown that the constitutional right of the Takings Clause
contains a right to a certain decisionmaking process to determine just
compensation. In other words, it must be shown that takings or just
compensation doctrine itself mandates a certain process for determining just
compensation. If such a right to traditional process is mandated by the Takings
Clause, then and only then is this an unconstitutional conditions case. Of course,
the traditional process for determining just compensation is the judicial process
217. Id. at 2317.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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and the form of compensation is money.220 But is such process mandated by the
Takings Clause? The words of the Takings Clause give no clue to this
procedural right. Moreover, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate due procedures for affecting rights, and the procedures
guaranteed to be due are not necessarily a full adversarial hearing and especially
not one before a traditional court of law.22 ' To find civil procedural rights outside
the Due Process Clauses would be novel constitutional jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the Court in Nollan222 and again in Dolan223 does not
quibble with the regulatory process that determined the claimant's rights. In
Dolan, the Court merely said that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause "rough
proportionality" standard requires "no mathematical calculation.., but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."224
Just such an individualized finding was apparently made by the City Planning
Commission.2 ' With a minor change the Tigard City Council approved the
Commission's final order.226 The Land Use Board of Appeals affirmed on the
grounds that the "reasonable relationship" test (the state equivalent of the "rough
proportionality" test)22 findings were supported by substantial evidence. In turn,
the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.228
In this case then, an elaborate procedure was followed. The first step was
essentially non-adversarial where substantial individualized findings were made,
followed by a quasi-adversarial hearing before the city council which made an
essentially de novo review, followed by three steps of review using review
standards. But when the case got to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
made a de novo finding and assumed that the burden of proof was on the city. It
did this in spite of affirming in principle the standard used by the lower review
220. There is muttering to the effect that only money will do. Robert H. Buesing, Money Isn't
Everything: Nonmember Benefits in Eminent Domain Settlements, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION
LAW, TAKINGS, COMPENSATION AND BENEFrrS 182-94 (Alan T. Ackerman ed., 1994). Buesing
states, "[g]enerally speaking, it is held that the Constitution requires a monetary payment for just
compensation." Id. at 184. He cites 8 NICHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMArN § 802 (Julius
Sackman ed.) (rev. 3d ed. 1973); a 1795 U.S. reporter which turns out to be the opinion of two
justices on circuit, Van Home's Lesseev. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 315 (1795); and a 1955
Idaho case. None of these cites even supports his proposition. His own article belies it as do other
articles in the same volume. See, e.g., Stephen W. Swartz, The Effect of Special Benefits in
Determining Compensation, in CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW, TAKINGS, COMPENSATION AND
BENEFrrS 102 (Alan T. Ackerman ed., 1994).
221. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
222. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
223. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309.
224. Id. at 2319-20.
225. Id. at 2314-15.
226. Id. at 2315.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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courts, saying "we do not adopt [the 'reasonable relationship' test] as such, partly
because the term 'reasonable relationship' seems confusingly similar to the term
'rational basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as 'rough
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment."229 In other words a reasonableness test, not a rational basis test, is
appropriate, and "reasonable relationship" was exactly the standard used by the
courts below. The Court nowhere says the courts below used the wrong standard.
It is clear then that Dolan is a mistake: the initial decisionmaker used the
right substantive standard to make its findings, the finding that the substantive
standard was supported by substantial evidence was correct, and the process used
to make that finding violated no constitutional norm (indeed, was not even
constitutionally suspect). The Supreme Court's mistake was in assuming, quite
unconsciously apparently, that "just compensation" implies a certain adversarial
adjudicative process-an assumption which is contradicted by constitutional text
and precedent. 3
229. Id. at 2319 (emphasis added).
230. The question of the burden of persuasion in a case like this has more analytical complexity
than at first meets the eye. There are three contexts for the use of burdens of persuasion: trial,
appellant review and constitutional review. In each context, it has a rhetorical and a normative
aspect As a norm, it dictates who loses in close cases before juries and courts. At the trial level
its normative aspect is most explicit and the rules about burdens of proof are well-understood by
lawyers. The "standards of proof' (required clarity) are "preponderance," "clear and convincing"
and "beyond a reasonable doubt" The burden of proof at this level means identifying the side in
a bipolar dispute who loses if the standard of required clarity of facts is not met The one initiating
the law suit usually has the burden for most issues in the case.
At the appellate level, the burden of persuasion falls almost automatically on the party
seeking to overturn the initial decision. The "standard of review" replaces the "standard of proof,"
and three review standards can be used by the human brain: reasonableness, de novo, and the
seldom-used bad faith. De novo is essentially not "review" but a new decision based on a cold
record and written briefs. Bad faith is only used where there is no power to review, but the
reviewing court nonetheless asks, "was the initial court decision an honest judgment?"
Reasonableness is the only true review standard, although one can roughly see a rational basis (look
only at the prevailing sides evidence-the old "scintilla" test) and a reasonable weighing (substantial
evidence on the record as a whole) division.
In the context of constitutional review, the burden of persuasion is much more a rhetorical
device than a normative standard. Nonetheless, it counts heavily. Constitutional courts talk about
"close scrutiny," "high and low scrutiny" and levels of"deference." Such talk is seldom formulated
into rules of decision per se. Rather, the court will say the "government must show" or "where
there is a strong presumption of constitutionality then . .. ."
Why are constitutional review standards of persuasion underdeveloped as explicit norms
and often understated even as rhetoric? First, the nature of constitutional review is very different
from appellate review. Constitutional review is not the review of an explicit and discrete finding
of fact and law by a lower court as with appellate review. The appellate court has a role spelled
out in explicit rules. The constitutional court is constantly defining its role as part of its self-
assumed constitutional review mission. The constitutional court reviews implicit findings of social
(often called "legislative") facts and political judgments made about those social facts by co-equal
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But let's assume a different unstated assumption. Let's assume that the
court used a heightened scrutiny substantive due process test. Let's assume the
Court reasoned as follows: the Takings Clause right to no-taking-of-property-
without-compensation is incorporated in the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and when "liberties" are so incorporated any state action affecting
them loses its presumption of constitutionality and the court should subject such
action to close scrutiny. Such close scrutiny always puts the burden of
demonstration on the state. Fine. But wait, the right to no-taking-sans-
compensation was not violated by the forced dedication aspect of the City of
Tigard's action. The city knew that such forced dedication was "taking" and that
some kind of "roughly proportional" compensation was necessary, and its action
clearly evinces its efforts to comply with the requirement of just compensation
and its belief that it had complied. Unless one claims that every determination
of just compensation in eminent domain must be subject to heightened scrutiny,
then the forced dedication here creates no such claim. But if we dig even deeper,
it may not be the "forced dedication" that creates the "takings" mentality in the
Chief Justice; it may merely be the regulation of the future use of Dolan's 1.67
acre lot in the City of Tigard. Now we are back to Mahon and Lucas and the
essential sin of those cases-treating the future use of land as "property" within
the Takings Clause. Now we perhaps see the wages of crying "petty larceny of
the police power."' It is "to Lochner." "Lochnering" is exactly what the court
did in Dolan. Justice Rufus Peckham lives, revived by Holmes, after all. Isn't
constitutional law grand!
V. A BRIEF SUMMING UP
The Holmesian rhetoric of property as value had festered in the legal
system for seventy years causing no real harm to constitutional jurisprudence until
Justice Scalia brought it to life in Lucas. Disguised somewhat by the "all/some
line," which suggests a dispossession/possession line, the doctrine of Lucas
(including the all/some line) is nonetheless clearly and firmly embedded in the
idea that property is value and that the word "property" as used in the Takings
Clause has this vernacular meaning.
branches of government whose role it is to make those judgments---"co-equal" meaning "those
judgments" are final.
Second, constitutional review is very different from de novo decision making. De novo
decision making is never the review of someone else's decision about a dispute, but a fresh and
usually firsthand examination of the factual evidence and a fresh application of political judgment
(legislatures, administrative rulemakers) or legal judgment (courts, administrative rulemakers and
adjudicators). Constitutional review is just that: "review" of someone else's judgment Third,
constitutional review only takes place in the context of either a de novo trial or appellate review.
That itself can be the source of much confusion.
231. LETrM, supra note 1, at 457.
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This vernacular meaning of "property" has not been, and ought not to be,
the meaning ascribed to "property" in the Takings Clause. The meaning of the
word "property" as used in the Due Process Clause was somewhat expanded in
the civil procedural due process cases to include entitlements granted by positive
governmental action. But such entitlements, because announced in clear language
or a positive course of action, create the kind of expectation that is both fixed and
settled. The aberrational case is Mahon where the future use was fixed in a deed
and settled as between the owners and that part of the public the Kohler Act (as
interpreted by the Holmes-led majority, but not by Brandeis) sought to benefit.
Moreover, the word "property" as used in the Takings Clause should, because of
context and precedent, have a narrower meaning than as used in the Due Process
Clauses.
Substantive due process ought to be used and is used in state courts to
review legislative and administrative action that restricts the future use of land
(and other things of property). The future use of property is surely a "liberty"
within that clause. Because of the subjective balancing nature of the substantive
due process inquiry such review will be deferential to the initial political decision.
But deference ought not to mean "no review" as it has in the federal courts since
its Holmesian-inspired demise in the 1930s.2 12 Nectow933 (concurred in by Holmes
and Brandeis) is a good working example of how substantive due process can be,
has been and ought to be used to review restrictions on the future use of the
things of property. Substantive due process does not involve the doctrine of
"inverse condemnation"234 which must after Lucas hang like the sword of
Damocles over every public body attempting to regulate land use in the public
interest.
Finally, I hope it is clear from the above that Holmes and Scalia in
Mahon and Lucas have created a doctrine that is atextual and ahistoric. The
court's holdings make clear that it has always and only drawn the "possession is
property and property is possession" line in actual decisions. This concept of
"property" as "possession" serves the function of identifying those interferences
with use that create the fundamental injustice of theft-the injustice that animates
the Takings Clause. This is so because possession creates fixed and settled
expectations. A fundamental basis of a just government in a just society is to
identify and then protect and defend the fixed and settled expectations of its
individual citizens. Because the concept of possession serves to identify fixed and
settled expectations, it is a very functional concept. The concept of possession
includes developmental uses of land once they come into existence-we possess
232. Although technically an "equal protection" case, United States Railroad RetirementBoard v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), is a good example of what I mean by high deference being no review
at all.
233. Nectow, 277 U.S. 183.
234. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
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the land with our building, pond, enclosure. Existing developmental uses are the
only kind of use of land (and other things) that creates fixed and settled
expectations. Uses-in-contemplation, developmental or otherwise, are, except in
the rare case like Mahon, neither fixed nor settled. Moreover, uses-in-
contemplation do not "feel" possessory-one does not yet possess the land with
the building that exists only in the mind's eye.
Thus it is that the concept of possession has served well to identify fixed
and settled expectations and, thus, to identify the occasions when the Takings
Clause is violated by uncompensated regulation. By showing the identity between
"possession," and "fixed and settled expectations," I have attempted to show that
the conceptual approach actually used by the Court (often with consternation and
embarrassment) has been finctional all along.
The talk in Mahon and the talk and decision in Lucas are an alien but
seductive rhetoric-a siren song. But that siren song has not seduced past Courts
and will not, in spite of Lucas, seduce this one.
